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when Abw II was finally subjugated to SS control after the failure of the
July 1944 coup and was transformed into Section D (Mil D) of the newly
created Militärisches Amt (Military Branch [Amt Mil or Mil Amt]) under
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Directorate [RSHA]),
Eisenberg’s position as head of the Chefgruppe (chief of Mil D HQ staff)^4
was relatively secure under the command of an army staff officer named
Fritz Naumann.^5 It was in fact rumoured that Eisenberg had saved
Naumann’s life during the perilous night of Nazi revenge on 20/21 July
1944, but just how this happened remains unclear. Succeeding Naumann
in January 1945, after Naumann had deliberately engineered his own dis-
missal by going AWOL in December 1944,^6 Roland Loos, a Viennese
friend of RSHA chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner,^7 was appointed deputy head of
Mil D by its nominal head, the odious Otto Skorzeny, who was too busy
elsewhere (or too lazy) to have anything to do with Mil D himself.^8 With
little else to do so late in the war, which was fortunate because Loos knew
absolutely nothing about intelligence work, he busied himself with
attempts to Nazify the personnel under his command and was constantly
on the lookout for subversive elements within Mil D but could never
detect any, though the majority of the personnel were, like Eisenberg,
resolutely anti-Nazi. Much as he wished to, Loos found himself unable to
dismiss Eisenberg simply because he was so competent, and Loos was any-
thing but.^9 However, when Mil D was to be transferred from Bad Elster
(Saxony) to Reit-im-Winkl (Bavaria) to join in Skorzeny’s mythical ‘last
stand’ in April 1945, Eisenberg requested release from active duty because
he was too old and unhealthy for mountain warfare, and Loos was more
than happy to oblige. Eisenberg lost no time in then surrendering to US
forces at Bad Elster, and was soon on his way to the safety of an American
POW camp at Kassel (Hesse) (Fig. 9.1).^10
For most of the war years, Werner Eisenberg, who was described as
‘most efficient and a very quick worker,’ had certainly needed to be
because he had continued practising law and managing his complex busi-
ness affairs while serving as an Abwehr intelligence officer. Even so, it
seems that Eisenberg’s legal and business interests sometimes prevented
him from dealing with urgent operational matters promptly. In May 1943,
for example, Eisenberg severely delayed progress on the MAMMUT mis-
sion to Kurdistan because he had simply forgotten to apply for formal
Wehrmachtführungsstab (Armed Forces Command) approval of the mis-
sion, though he was well aware that the paperwork was essential and
urgent.^11 Obviously he was under tremendous stress because a month ear-
A PLACE IN THE SHADE