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supervised by Edmund Tilley at the Combined Services Detailed
Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) at Maadi (Egypt) over a period of three
months between July and October 1943.^23 A great deal of detailed, state-
of- the-art information was extracted from Müller on the Abwehr, espe-
cially Abw II operations. Coupled with the roughly simultaneous
interrogation of the SS operative Franz Mayr, captured on 15 August
1943 in Tehran, who was equally cooperative under interrogation (also
under Tilley’s supervision), British intelligence obtained within a few
months more up-to-date information about the Abwehr and RSHA VI
than from almost any other espionage cases in any theatre since the war
began.^24 Also of significance was the way in which British security and the
Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had cooperated success-
fully to arrest the MAMMUT parachutists and had thereby passed their
first major test since the days of Rashid Ali. Within a few hours of the
group’s descent, the British and Iraqi authorities had realized that a land-
ing had been made and had acted swiftly to capture the German opera-
tives.^25 However, their rapid response was greatly accelerated by a curious
combination of events in which meticulous Abwehr planning was con-
founded by Luftwaffe incompetence. The parachutists had made every
attempt to ensure that they would be correctly dressed on arrival in
Kurdistan, where subtly varied tribal dress was still worn by Kurdish men
in the 1940s. Consequently, after thorough research and with Ramzi’s
expert knowledge, all four men were attired in authentic, hand-sewn
Kurdish costumes when they landed. However, their clothes were suitable
for wear only in the tribal region of their intended dropzone. Once spot-
ted by observant villagers near the actual landing point, the conspicuous
intruders were immediately reported to the local police, who lost no time
in alerting the security authorities.^26
In one sense it was perhaps fortunate for the MAMMUT parachutists
that they were dropped off-zone and had no access to their equipment,
because the possession of weapons and W/T sets would have incriminated
them.^27 Instead, under the existing penal code, all that the Iraqi CID
could charge the three Germans with was the relatively minor offence of
illegal entry. Consequently, to keep them in captivity as prisoners of war,
the only course of action was for the Iraqis to lay no charges at all and to
turn the three over to CICI, which finally transpired about a year after
their arrival in Iraq.^28 As an Iraqi Kurd, however, Rashid Ramzi’s case was
different: he could only expect severe treatment at the hands of his Arab
compatriots. In December 1944, after considerable delay because of con-