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certainly know that the Americans subsequently attempted to use Koch as
an agent in occupied Germany. However, all that is to be found in the
American records about him is the following uncorroborated comment by
US counterintelligence (OSS X-2): ‘This agent has proved to be unreliable
and continues under arrest. His project has been dropped.’ Since Koch’s
unreliability may well have had something to do with the veracity of the
information he had provided the Americans, one must treat what little we
know of KINO with caution. If only we knew when planning began, we
might have a clearer picture of whether the project was rooted in a realistic
appreciation of the war situation. Or was it just some lunatic oil-denial
scheme concocted by anti-Soviet SS ideologues in the last months of the
war when its execution was already far beyond the realm of possibility?^44
As has already been described, by no means all Abwehr covert initiatives
targeting Iraq were planned by Abw II (later Mil D) in Berlin. For as long
as Turkey remained neutral, and diplomatic relations were maintained
between Turkey and Nazi Germany (i.e. until August 1944), KONO in
Istanbul was also potentially able to conduct subversive operations against
Iraq. Commanded by a trusted friend of Admiral Canaris, Paul
Leverkuehn,^45 KONO was one of a number of Abwehr stations operating
independently of Germany’s diplomatic representations in neutral coun-
tries where there was sufficient espionage activity to warrant the Abwehr’s
operational participation and constant counterespionage surveillance.
Istanbul, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, was of course teeming with
agents of many nations and nationalities, offering both the Allied and Axis
secret services many opportunities for the launching of clandestine initia-
tives. Through a number of disaffected and expatriate Iraqis resident in
Istanbul, the Abwehr contacted visiting Iraqis and persuaded some of
them to work in their cause. These attempts seem to have targeted mostly
students and invalids—in other words, individuals likely to be short of
funds and to have time on their hands. However, the Germans experi-
enced great difficulty in planting such agents in Iraq, mostly because DSO
Iraq worked in close cooperation with DSO Turkey to prevent the
Abwehr’s schemes from being implemented.^46 When three Abwehr offi-
cers—Erich Vermehren, Wilhelm Hamburger, and Karl Kleczkowski—
defected from KONO to the British in February 1944, their interrogations
quickly revealed how little the Germans actually knew about Abwehr
intentions and operations in Iraq that was not already known to British
intelligence.^47 From 1941 onwards, ISOS, ISK, and ISOCICLE decrypts
(known regionally as TRIANGLE), of course, gave British intelligence the
A PLACE IN THE SHADE