The Baghdad Set_ Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45

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captivity, see Adrian O’Sullivan, Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia
(Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–45
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) [NSW], 49–53.


  1. Herzog Joachim Ernst von Anhalt (1901–1947) was a trained agricultural
    and forestry farmer. Always at odds with the Nazis, he was arrested in 1944
    and imprisoned at Dachau concentration camp for three months. He was
    arrested again in September 1945—this time by the Soviets—and was sent
    to the notorious NKVD Special Camp No. 2 at the site of Buchenwald
    concentration camp. The Duke of Anhalt died at the camp on 18 February
    1947, and his remains were thrown into a mass grave. Scott Mehl, ‘Joachim
    Ernst, Duke of Anhalt,’ Unofficial Royalty: The Site for Royal News and
    Discussion, http://www.unofficialroyalty.com/category/formermonar-
    chies/german/anhalt-royals/ (accessed 11 May 2018).

  2. Abw II (and subsequently Mil D) was divided into the HQ staff (Eisenberg)
    and the following nine desks: East (Schöneich), West (Gambke), Southwest
    (Lormis), Southeast (Niklasch/Ferid), Middle East (Wagner), Finance
    (Todte), Air (Paulus), Technical (Mauritius), and Evaluation and Planning
    (Kniesche). When Wagner was transferred to Leit West in France in
    December 1944, the Middle East desk was disbanded. Annex I, Changes
    in Abw II organization (1942–1945) as known to Ferid, Intermediate
    Interrogation Report (CI-IIR) No. 44, 18 January 1946, Record Group
    263, Entry ZZ18, Box 35, NARA.

  3. See Perry Biddiscombe, SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the
    Nazi Resistance Movement 1944–45 (Stroud: Tempus, 2006), 36–9.

  4. Biddiscombe, SS Hunter Battalions, 37. Eisenberg must of course have
    been fully aware of—and possibly even connived at—Naumann’s
    intentions.

  5. Kaltenbrunner encouraged the development of an élite clique of Austrian
    officers within the RSHA, many of whom were old acquaintances from his
    Vienna days. See NSW, 76, 135–6, 140.

  6. According to Biddiscombe, SS Hunter Battalions, 37, Skorzeny never once
    visited Mil D HQ. Regarding Skorzeny and the inflation of his reputation
    by historians and journalists, see NSW, 95–7; Adrian O’Sullivan, Espionage
    and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Success of the Allied
    Secret Services (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) [ECOP], 177,
    181–2, 189.

  7. For more about Loos, see PIR No. 67, CI-FIR/72, HQ US Forces
    European Theater Interrogation Center, APO 757, 19 September 1945,
    Records of the U.S. Nürnberg War Crimes Trials: Interrogations, 1946–
    1949, Record Group 238, NARA.

  8. SCI 12th Army Group Munich to CO X-2 Germany, 13 July 1945, Record
    Group 263, Entry ZZ18, Box 35, NARA. Many of the details in this pro-


ADRIAN O’SULLIVAN

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