Ibid.; Security Intelligence Summary No. 66, Defence Security Office,
CICI Iraq, 1 August–3 September 1944, AIR 29/2512, TNA.
Security Intelligence Summary No. 66, Defence Security Office, CICI
Iraq, 1 August–3 September 1944, AIR 29/2512, TNA.
It is interesting today to witness the continuity of the obsessive hostility of
the Turks towards their Kurdish and Armenian minorities. It remains at
cross-purposes with Western (or NATO) policy, just as it was at odds with
the Allies in 1944, and is currently impeding the efforts of the United
States and other allied powers to defeat the remaining Salafist militants
(Daesh or Islamic State) operating in Syria.
Security Intelligence Summary No. 67, Defence Security Office, CICI
Iraq, 4 September–1 October 1944, AIR 29/2512, TNA.
Security Intelligence Summary No. 69, Defence Security Office, CICI
Iraq, 1 November–1 December 1944, AIR 29/2512, TNA.
History of Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia, June 1941–
December 1944, AIR 29/2504, TNA.
American Christian Palestine Committee, The Arab War Effort: A
Documented Account (New York: American Christian Palestine Committee,
1946), 19.
Cf. Hinsley and Simkins, Security and Counter-Intelligence, 212–13.
A dark grey, low-winged monoplane with four radial engines and twin tail
fins: clearly a Junkers Ju-290 heavy bomber, with extra fuel tanks in the
bomb bay and a crew of 11 (including six air gunners), as used only by the
Gartenfeld special duties squadron (Kampfgeschwader 200 z.b.V) for
Ferneinsätze (long-range operations). Tel Afar Parachute Expedition
Report No. 3, 12 February 1945, AIR 29/2513, TNA. For Karl-Edmund
Gartenfeld and Luftwaffe blind drops, see NSW, 167–9, 172–5; David
Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1978), 285–6; J. Richard Smith et al., On Special
Missions: The Luftwaffe’s Research and Experimental Squadrons 1923–1945
(London: Classic, 2003), 13. In captivity, Rasul and Fellah claimed that
they had been dropped off-zone; however, since Karradi never communi-
cated the detailed plans of the aerial insertion to the other participants, it
is unlikely they could have known this. On the basis of various records at
AIR 29/2513, TNA, it is also unclear whether there was an outbound
refuelling stop at Maritsa aerodrome on Rhodes (unlikely), or if refuelling
took place on the return flight (likely). Whatever route was taken, massive
Allied air superiority at end-1944 explains the need for six air gunners and
two extra waist-gunner positions on the Ju-290.
Tel Afar Parachute Expedition Report No. 3, 12 February 1945, AIR
29/2513, TNA.
