Crawford to Allen, 1 August 1944, Record Group 226, Entry 217, Box 1,
NARA. The only other Western active-espionage operative in Tabriz
appears to have been the British vice-consul, David Marshall Lang (1924–
1991), who was a very young army officer at the time and probably work-
ing for MI6 against the Russians, presumably under R.C. ‘Robin’ Zaehner.
For evidence of Lang’s diplomatic cover, see Telegram from Baku to
Moscow, The Situation in Iranian Azerbaijan, 26 November 1945, History
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Russian State Archive of Socio-
Political History (RGASPI), F.558, Op.11, D.99, L.64–66. Lang later
taught Georgian at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and
happened to be the warden of my London University hall of residence. I
recall him as an affable, jolly man, very popular with students, but silent
about his secret career, of which we ingenuous undergrads, of course, had
no inkling.
While OSS agreed to provide him with a robust American vehicle for field
work, ‘Craig’ remained on the IPC payroll, with expenses reimbursed by
OSS, together with ad hoc payments in return for strategic information.
Near East Section report, 15 April 1944, Record Group 226, Entry 210,
Box 261, NARA.
Penrose to Loud, 22 October 1943, Folder 4, Box 5, Series 8 (OSS), PP.
If ‘Robert Craig’s’ real identity were known, it might be possible to dis-
cover if he continued to work for OSS. History of the Near East Section,
OSS Cairo from 15 May 1943 to 15 September 1944, Record Group 226,
Entry 210, Box 261, NARA; Near East, Supplement to No. 14, Near East
Section SI, No. 14a, n.d. (probably late 1942), Record Group 226, NARA.
See inter alia Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs, 60–6 (with specific reference to
OSS-SI at the London HQ level); Smith, OSS, 34 passim; Christopher
D. O’Sullivan, FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power
in the Middle East (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 27–48.
Distressingly simplistic given the complex wartime context, the last
author’s chapter entitled ‘Iraq between Two Empires: Great Britain, Arab
Nationalism, and the Origins of American Power’ is more sharply critical of
British influence and behaviour in Iraq, and of Nuri as-Said in particular,
than of Rashid Ali, the ex-Mufti, and their pro-Nazi supporters, who are
naively ‘spun’ as champions of Arab independence. This is an analysis that
neither Bill Donovan nor Steve Penrose would have accepted.
Cf. Alex Kellar’s comment in April 1944 that while he respected the
extreme cordiality of relations with the CIC [US Counter Intelligence
Corps], ‘any information on American political and commercial intentions
in the Middle East, which might be reflected in the methods and activities
of American intelligence organizations, especially OSS, would be wel-
comed in London.’ Minutes of the SIME annual conference held in Beirut
2–4 April 1944, KV 4/234, TNA.
