6
who created the worldwide civilian scouting movement on the basis of his
experiences as an army intelligencer in South Africa before and during the
Boer War (1890–1902), was actually quite specific about the distinct cat-
egories of military scout that existed in his day, referring to them as ‘inves-
tigators’ or ‘military agents.’ He subdivided them further into ‘strategical
and tactical agents’ on the one hand and ‘field spies’ on the other. It is this
latter category, which Baden-Powell described as ‘those who act as scouts
in disguise to reconnoitre the enemy,’ that best fits those who operated
around the world on behalf of British interests between the World Wars.^19
By disguise, of course, the general did not necessarily mean the wearing of
tribal costumes, false beards, and black wigs. However, he did mean the
abandonment of uniform, which he felt was the act that converted a scout
into a spy. And for spies captured out of uniform, the normal punishment
was death. After the First World War, though, most people who scouted
for the Empire overseas were civilians without any uniform, though some
in the foreign or consular service still appeared at formal diplomatic func-
tions resplendent in their gold braid and ostrich feathers. And so, the figu-
rative concept of ‘cover’—the use of an identity other than one’s own to
camouflage one’s scouting activities—effectively replaced the literal con-
cept of disguise. In other words, though the intelligence sought by a scout
was seldom secret, his or her intelligence role usually was, and it had to be
protected at all cost.
There was also the question of the imperial scout’s self-image to con-
sider: did these people see themselves as despicable spies destined for the
gallows or the guillotine if captured? Every indication suggests that they
did not. On the contrary, they were serving their king and empire by
undertaking secret missions far from home, often at greater personal risk
from political unrest or general lawlessness and brigandry than from their
own covert activities. However strategically valuable, the geospatial, cul-
tural, economic, and political data that British scouts sought, gathered,
and transmitted to their parent organizations were usually not secret but
openly available to anyone.^20 It was therefore not a question of legitimacy,
but simply of being in the right place at the right time. To accomplish this,
it was merely necessary to have sufficient reason, time, and funds to travel
to wherever intelligence was to be found and gathered, like picking dai-
sies. Linguistic skills, cultural experience, and social contacts were usually
deemed desirable if not essential. Provided the scout’s cover occupation
and apparent personal interest in certain information did not betray
Britain’s strategic interest in it, then all was well. Unless local conditions