37
(1892–1965) was flirting with political disaster, al-Husayni doubtless real-
ized that he had overplayed his hand and had made the fatal mistake of
getting himself identified with one faction in Iraqi politics, and an unpop-
ular one at that.^22 This partly explains why, as soon as the fugitive pair
reached Berlin, rather than cooperating on Arab projects, the ex-Mufti
sought to distance himself from Rashid Ali by picking a political quarrel
with him that evolved through several phases and lasted for most of the war.
After the four generals called the ‘Golden Square’ seized power on 1
April 1941, the Gaylani fascist interregnum lasted exactly two months
(April–May 1941): the first month was characterized by the gradual occu-
pation of southern Iraq by 10th Indian Division; the second, by the encir-
clement of RAF Habbaniya by Iraqi forces beginning on 30 April, the
siege of the British embassy from 1 to 30 May, the air campaign, and the
rapid advance on Baghdad and other areas by British and Indian forces
from the west (HABFORCE, spearheaded by KINGCOL)^23 and the south
(IRAQFORCE). Hostilities ceased when Gaylani, the ex-Mufti, and their
supporters fled to Persia on 29 May; when Fritz Grobba and members of
the German mission crossed into Syria on 29–30 May; and when the armi-
stice was signed at 15.30 hrs on 31 May 1941.
The attack on Habbaniya was full of adventure and derring-do.^24 One
might have thought that someone would by now have dramatized it and
filmed it, either for the silver screen or for television. There is certainly no
lack of action in the historical narrative, which has been well covered by
military historians, and there were indeed some colourful participants,
such as such as H.G. ‘Reggie’ Smart (1891–1963), the Air Officer
Commanding (AOC). Smart, a competent former Royal Flying Corps
(RFC) fighter pilot and an RAF administrative officer, had been the per-
fect choice to run the Habbaniya pilot-training scheme (No. 4 FTS).
However, suddenly finding himself directing a desperate air battle, he
became hysterical. Smart suffered a total nervous breakdown and had to
be heavily sedated and evacuated via Basra to India.^25 Apart from the tes-
timony of Freya Stark’s diary,^26 which is a great read, surprisingly little has
been written of the embassy siege, another narrative ripe for filmic treat-
ment.^27 It is not possible, however, to describe the events of May 1941,
including the siege, through the eyes of British intelligence, since normal
communications and regular intelligence analyses were suspended
throughout the month. The most reliable alternative is the linear narrative
of the conflict as seen through the eyes of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the
British ambassador, and reported by him post facto to Anthony Eden at the
PRELUDE TO CONFLICT AND THE EMBASSY SIEGE