38
Foreign Office (FO) in June. Cornwallis’s lucid description of the opening
military move by Rashid Ali against Habbaniya at the end of April is a
historical document that deserves to be acknowledged as a classic of the
FO descriptive genre—poised, accurate, and concise: ‘During the night of
April 29th/30th it was observed in Baghdad that the mechanized force of
the Iraqi army under Lieutenant-Colonel Fahmi Said, including a quantity
of mechanized artillery, moved out of its barracks in the Muaskar Rashid,
and having crossed the new King Faisal Bridge in Baghdad, continued to
move in a westerly direction towards Falluja. This movement suggested a
threat to the air base at Habbaniya, and it was reported to the AOC from
the embassy by urgent telegram at about 2.30 a.m. on the morning of
April 30th. Some part, if not all, of this force was in position commanding
the Habbaniya air base by first light on April 30th, and shortly afterwards
the Iraqi commander sent a message to the AOC demanding that there
should be no more flying nor any movement of forces outside the canton-
ment and giving warning that the Iraqi authorities would shell aircraft
attempting to take off from the aerodrome or armoured cars leaving the
perimeter. This action immediately placed the British women and children
who had arrived at Habbaniya on the previous afternoon in a position of
great danger. It was a direct breach of the assurance which had been given
and an act of gross treachery. The AOC informed me of this ultimatum,
and shortly after noon I sent a member of my staff to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs with a written protest coupled with a request that the Iraqi
forces should at once be withdrawn from the vicinity of Habbaniya. I
added that, if this were not done, responsibility for the consequences
would rest with the Iraqi authorities.’^28
What then followed in Baghdad was the siege of the British embassy
(Fig. 2.1). As a precaution, during the morning of 30 April, Cornwallis
gave orders putting into operation a pre-existing emergency scheme which
brought about the protective concentration of the remaining British sub-
jects within the precincts of the embassy and the US legation. In all about
350 people came to the embassy, and about half that number went to the
Americans.^29 Cornwallis warned Rashid Ali that, if the British embassy or
the US legation were threatened, or if any harm were done to British sub-
jects in Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, the AOC would at once take appro-
priate action. From then on, the embassy was cut off from all telephonic
communication except with the Iraqi foreign-affairs minister. No further
cipher telegrams from the embassy were accepted for transmission, though
radio communications were possible until the night of 2 May. In addition,