41
and to hoist it from a pole in the grounds that was not visible from
the street.^33
There were other things to ensure that morale remained high among
those trapped in the embassy compound. Unusual for a siege, after the
first few days of tight rationing, food became plentiful. With the help of
the Iraqi foreign-affairs ministry, a regular daily supply of food was deliv-
ered, and volunteers prepared simple but adequate meals for everyone.
Necessary medical stores were also obtained in the same manner.
Fortunately, among the besieged were several doctors and nurses, includ-
ing the palace physician, Dr. ‘Sinbad’ Sinderson. They ensured that the
sick were cared for, and that sanitary services were organized to prevent
epidemics. On the whole, the health of the community remained remark-
ably good. Meanwhile, a sense of security was promoted by members of
the embassy-based British military mission, who provided guards and
patrols by day and night. The press attaché’s staff distributed frequent
news bulletins based on information heard on the radio, and a number of
entertainments and other distractions were organized to combat bore-
dom. It was also very encouraging to see British aircraft flying daily over
Baghdad, not only on reconnaissance flights and air raids, but also to drop
pamphlets and demonstrate their air superiority. Such sorties clearly had a
sobering and restraining effect on Baghdadis, making the embassy a safer
refuge than it might otherwise have been.^34
As the weeks passed, and the situation grew progressively worse for the
rebel Iraqis, ever fewer demands were made of Cornwallis, yet those that
were tended to be more and more bizarre. For example, the ambassador
found himself having to protect the lives of the Iraqi servants who had
opted to remain at the embassy from the beginning, while free to leave at
any time. On 16 May, a fortnight before its demise, the Rashid Ali govern-
ment proclaimed that all Iraqis in the service of the British government,
unless they left their posts within seven days, would be condemned to
death and their property would be seized. The matter was not pursued
further after Cornwallis pointed out that the British government would
take direct retaliatory action against all Iraqi diplomatic missions and con-
sulates in territories under their control. Then, from 17 May onwards,
various Iraqi protests began to accumulate as the RAF bombing and straf-
ing campaign intensified. Cornwallis responded, according to instructions
he had received from the FO, that British forces had so far scrupulously
abstained from bombing nonmilitary targets, and that any acts of violence
committed against British subjects would be met with ‘drastic retribution.’
PRELUDE TO CONFLICT AND THE EMBASSY SIEGE