The Baghdad Set_ Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45

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© The Author(s) 2019 47
A. O’Sullivan, The Baghdad Set,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15183-6_3


CHAPTER 3


War within War


The cloud of war, which a year ago loomed no larger than a man’s
hand on the horizon of Mesopotamia, grew with biblical rapidity until
... it had darkened the greater part of the sky.
—Sir Basil Newton
The British attitude towards the Rashid Ali rebellion is still
remembered as an almost incredible example of forbearance in
circumstances where forbearance could not possibly be construed as
weakness.
—Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird

The strategic significance of the political situation in Iraq leading up to and
during the pro-German Rashid Ali al-Gaylani interregnum (1 April–29 May
1941) is best understood in terms of the deep division between the Schein
und Wirklichkeit (appearance and reality) of Nazi foreign policy towards the
pan-Arabs and their desire for independence. It is telling that Adolf Hitler
did not issue his pertinent war directive on the Middle East until 23 May
1941, far too late for it to have any effect on events or operations in Iraq.^1


Newton to Eden, 17 January 1941, FO 371/27100, The National Archives,
Kew, Surrey [TNA].
Stonehewer-Bird to Bevin, 4 March 1946, FO 371/52423, TNA.

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