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Accompanied by an administrative staff of five, Fritz Grobba (code-
named ‘Franz Gehrke’ to deceive British intelligence) flew into Mosul
from Rhodes on 10 May with one Abw II liaison officer and military
adviser (Wilhelm Kohlhaas [1899–1995]) and two Brandenburger NCOs
(Wieland and Bulach), both Palestinians, who were to act as Arabic inter-
preters.^10 Eight days later, a second group arrived in Baghdad with staff
from the GFO, including Ribbentrop’s SS photographer (Helmut Laux)
and two Brandenburger sabotage NCOs (Brass and Kraytzberger) on sec-
ondment to Abw II. These two small groups were soon followed by a
number of German and Italian propaganda, military, oil, and trade experts,
who quickly took up various tasks in a manner that suggested the existence
of a coordinated, prearranged plan. The varied backgrounds of these
experts and the diversity of their activities might lead one to believe that
the German mission to Iraq was broadly conceived. This was not the case.
Grobba’s personal mission was essentially a limited two-pronged affair
involving German military intelligence (Abwehr) and the German air
force (Luftwaffe), with an additional GFO white-propaganda (publicity)
Fig. 3.1 RAF Habbaniya, looking south across the plateau on which Iraqi troops
deployed on 2 May 1941. Source: Wikimedia Commons
WAR WITHIN WAR