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Me-110 fighter-bombers) were deployed against a superior British force
10 times larger; which was well trained, supplied, and maintained; and
whose pilots were familiar with desert conditions. Consequently, within a
fortnight all but one of the German aircraft had been disabled or
destroyed.^14 One of the principal reasons for the failure of the German
intervention in the Anglo-Iraqi war was the lack of local fuel sources for
German aircraft. To their apparent surprise, the Kirkuk oilfields did not
produce refined aviation spirit. The planners must have assumed that the
RAF fuelled their aircraft locally, and that they could do the same, without
realizing that the British in Iraq imported all the refined petroleum prod-
ucts they needed from Burma. It is but one example of the astounding
lack of thorough intelligence work to support German military planners
when preparing for their Iraq mission.^15 Another was the failure to ensure
that German aircraft were properly prepared and maintained for service
under tropical desert conditions. Their engines lacked sand filters, for
instance; consequently, many were soon damaged beyond repair just from
normal running. The first problem was essentially logistical; the second,
technical. But both inadequacies were basically attributable to poor intel-
ligence and sheer inexperience. All one can say in mitigation is that
Rommel’s Afrika Korps had only been in North Africa for about a month
when war broke out in Iraq. Up to that time, German forces had never
fought or trained outside Europe. Consequently, German pilots had yet to
experience desert flying conditions and had no idea how they, their ground
crews, or their aircraft would perform. As it turned out, none of them did
well, and harsh lessons were learned that doubtless subsequently benefit-
ted German airmen in the Western Desert.^16
It was not only the Luftwaffe that had a fiasco on its hands; the Iraqi air
force failed completely. By the time the Germans arrived, the RAF had
already bombed and strafed all the Iraqi airfields, destroying and damag-
ing so many aircraft that the Iraqis no longer had an effective air force.^17
There had been no real resistance, mainly because the only relatively mod-
ern combat aircraft the Iraqis possessed had been grounded. Their recently
purchased Northrop A-17 fighter-bombers (known to the RAF as
Northrop Nomads) could not fly because the American manufacturers
had supplied them (as specified) without armaments. Colt machine guns
were hurriedly ordered from the United States. However, probably as a
result of good intelligence work and American cooperation, the cargo ship
carrying them was intercepted by the Royal Navy at Hormuz on 19 April
and diverted to Karachi.^18 Furthermore, to ensure that the Iraqis found no
WAR WITHIN WAR