54
other way of arming the aircraft, possibly with German aid, the British
decided to sabotage them on the ground. To this end, they turned to
G(R), the section of the general staff at GHQ Middle East responsible for
organizing all irregular and guerrilla activities in areas where these could
be carried out by uniformed personnel. In other words, unlike the Special
Operations Executive (SOE), G(R) could deploy uniformed special forces
in significant numbers in enemy and Allied countries where conventional
military operations were in progress, as well as in British or British-
controlled territory. A commando raid was executed with total success by
G(R) special forces: all 16 Northrop aircraft were destroyed.^19
Around the same time, another covert special-forces operation was
planned in Cairo and set in motion that combined two diverse objectives
aimed at undermining the German effort in Iraq: the destruction of
aviation- spirit stocks and the liquidation of the ex-Mufti. In November
1940, on the recommendation of the joint chiefs, Churchill had already
officially sanctioned the ex-Mufti’s assassination in a full meeting of cabi-
net.^20 On 5 May 1941, the head of SOE in London was asked to take up
with the Foreign Office (FO) the question of the need for action against
the ex-Mufti. In Wavell’s strategic view, al-Husayni was nothing other
than a subsidized enemy agent who bore a considerable measure of
responsibility for the state of affairs in Iraq.^21 Around the same time, the
Air Ministry in London cabled SOE Cairo that the immediate destruction
of stockpiles of aviation fuel in Baghdad was essential. A list of various
dumps was provided.^22 However, the realization of these two objectives
was a problem because the two senior SOE field officers in Iraq, Cecil
Gervase Hope-Gill (1894–1984) (D/HH) and Adrian Bishop (D/KD),^23
were both besieged in the Baghdad embassy and were therefore unable to
organize and execute the operation locally. Another agency had to be
found, and quickly. It was decided that individual secret agents could not
be used; therefore, a uniformed special-forces operation had to be under-
taken. First, G(R) considered sending in a suicide squad by air, but their
proposal came to nothing. Ultimately, SOE turned to their so-called
‘friends’ in Palestine: the paramilitary wing of The Jewish Agency known
as the Haganah, which was more than willing to help SOE put its theories
of guerrilla warfare into practice.^24
The Haganah agreed to provide a group of 20 young ‘toughs’ of the
Irgun Zevai Leumi (IZL) to go to Iraq posing as Arabs, to break the
Rashid Ali revolt by using irregular methods. After Wavell had agreed to
his release from British detention in Palestine, their commander was
named as the now iconic Irgun leader David Raziel (1910–1941), who