55
was killed on 20 May in the desert west of Baghdad during a bombing
attack by three Luftwaffe He-111 bombers.^25 One source has suggested
that it was actually Raziel who insisted that an attempt on the hated ex-
Mufti’s life be added to the sabotage operation by making it a condition
of Irgun cooperation. According to the same source, Raziel selected only
three IZL toughs (Meridor, Sica, and Tarzi) to accompany him on the
mission. His first task after landing at RAF Habbaniya was to reconnoitre
the disposition of enemy forces in the vicinity of Falluja. It was on his way
back from this patrol that Raziel was killed.^26 After his death, according to
the SOE official history, the remaining Palestinians, disoriented without
leadership, spent their time lamenting their loss and complaining that
SOE had not trained them sufficiently to use their Arab cover. The opera-
tions themselves against the fuel dumps and the ex-Mufti had to be aban-
doned;^27 however, events soon rendered the Irgun objectives superfluous.
By 28 May 1941, there were no more operational Luftwaffe aircraft in
need of fuel; by 30 May, the ex-Mufti had fled to Persia.^28 Long after-
wards, SOE reached the conclusion that the entire undertaking had been
most dangerous and ill-conceived. It was lucky that the Iraqis had never
discovered that SOE had employed Palestinian Jews against them during
their revolt.^29
The thing is, SOE had long advocated for the use of Jewish forces in
Iraq, so it is hardly surprising that sooner or later they would have decided
to bring them into the action. In November 1940, George Pollock (1901–
1991) (D/HP), head of SOE Middle East, had expressed himself quite
forcibly on the subject. ‘Iraq is full of German agents,’ he wrote, ‘and we
ought to have an organization there to deal with them. A British fifth col-
umn should be trained now, ready to go into Iraq. ... There are some
thousands of highly trained Jewish troops in Palestine. They have been
trained in secret, their weapons have been smuggled in in secret, even
mobile artillery, and although raids have been made by the Palestine
Police, I do not believe they have ever found any weapons. Jews have a
great interest in winning this war. Why shouldn’t we help them to pene-
trate into Iraq and Iran as they have done in Palestine? ... We ought to be
able to put into Iraq 200 or 300 trained toughs.’^30 Ultimately, it would
not be in Iraq but in Syria that Jewish paramilitaries and other covert
agents were to prove their worth. Preceding the British military invasion
of Syria in June 1941, it was possible for SOE to organize a number of
Jewish advance raiding parties which were able to destroy Vichy fuel
dumps, cut communications, and generally act as guides to the inva-
sion forces.^31
WAR WITHIN WAR