65
The departure of the ex-Mufti at the end of May and the Italian lega-
tion on 9 June had undoubtedly deprived pro-Axis and anti-British propa-
ganda of its motive force.^3 However, the adherents of Rashid Ali, the
many convinced pro-Nazis in the Iraqi army and the public services, and
the irrecoverable anti-British elements in all parts of the country were
clearly still a potent force that would initially oppose any attempts to cul-
tivate a renewed public spirit in the land more friendly towards Britain.
Rashid Ali’s forceful propaganda had in fact made too deep an impression
for any sudden change. Many officers in the Iraqi army and the police were
indignant and resentful, and the government simply had to come to grips
with that reality before implementing any reforms. Given the overwhelm-
ing presence of large numbers of British and Indian forces throughout the
country, any future hostile action by Iraqi troops was bound to be of a
covert nature. It was therefore the responsibility of British counterintelli-
gence (Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia [CICI]) rather than
Persia and Iraq Force (PAIFORCE) military intelligence to remain con-
stantly vigilant and well informed about any such clandestine initiatives.
Close monitoring of Iraqi army officers throughout the country was
therefore maintained. In July, for instance, a report from a usually reliable
CICI source stated that a group of Iraqi army officers in Baghdad and
Mosul had been encouraging junior ranks to escape to the frontiers, where
they could lend their support to an invading German army by means of
sabotage operations and fifth-column activities against British and Indian
forces. Later, the group established an observation post to report on the
movements and equipment of British troops passing to northern Iraq and
across the Persian border. CICI was soon able to identify the leading
members of the group, whose operations were curtailed. Some officers of
Syrian origin were immediately deprived of Iraqi nationality and deported.^4
However, the dismal performance of the Iraqi police during the Farhud
showed that Rashid Ali’s political manipulation and propaganda had
severely undermined the force’s internal discipline. Therefore, the new
government, installed on 3 June with Jamil Madfai as prime minister, had
as its immediate tasks the re-establishment of relations with Britain on the
basis of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930; the swift punishment of rebels and
rioters; the restoration of discipline in the Iraqi army, police, and public
services; the elimination of Nazi propaganda; and, as a long-term objec-
tive, the conversion of Iraqi hearts and minds (which was to become Freya
Stark’s prime responsibility).^5 At the same time, to ensure a stable polity
resistant to enemy subversion within which the Iraqi government could
RESTORING THE PEACE