The Social Setting 101his special recipe for privatisation between 1995 and 1997.
This scheme directed revenue from Bolivia’s remaining
shares of state enterprises into retirement funds run by
private foreign companies, and indirectly phased out state
responsibility toward social welfare. Fifty-one per cent of the
former state companies were acquired by foreign owners,
while the 49 per cent counterpart funds were transferred by
the government in the form of stock shares to two foreign
Pensión fund managers.
When Latin Trade scheduled the grand event, they didn’t
know there would be a massive protest nearby against
the imminent ‘capitalisation’ of Bolivia’s most strategic
industry—Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(YPFB), the Bolivian oil company.
The state-run YPFB contributed 57 per cent of its profi ts to
the National Treasury. Even after deducting for corruption, the
YPFB was Bolivia’s primary source of revenue. Capitalisation
was lauded by the government as a way for YPFB to fi nance
the potentially lucrative gas pipeline to Brazil and rid Bolivia
of corruption.
The protesters disagreed, insisting that this huge loss
of revenue would cripple Bolivia’s meager but functioning
support system for health and education, and that Goni was
simply obeying the dictates of global fi nancial institutions.
Giving People a Chance
In a question-and-answer period following the award, a journalist
asked Goni why Bolivians were not permitted to buy shares of
YPFB, thereby financing the Brazil gas pipeline and avoiding
handing administrative control and strategic revenue to foreign
companies. “Bolivians would not be interested,” was Goni’s gruff
reply, despite suggestions presented by 20,000 protestors within
walking distance.Goni is now gone, and other defeatists have been
discredited. New leaders have taken his place, and these are
people who believe that Bolivia has the human, cultural and
natural resources to thrive.
These new leaders inherit a mangled economy but with a