aware that there is no good linguistics not only without a methodology of
science, but without a philosophy of language. That his philosophical choice
has fallen on Cartesian idealism obviously poses a problem, but this option
at least possesses the advantage of being explicit, permitting critique. This is
what I am now going to proceed to.
The conception of language in Chomsky
Chomsky has devoted numerous works to the philosophy of language –
nearly as many as his political works or linguistic works in the strict sense.
I shall base myself in the main on two texts: a collection of recent essays, New
Horizons in the Study of Mind, and the entry on ‘Language’ written by Chomsky
for The Oxford Companion to the Mind.^6
The entry is modestly entitled ‘Language: Chomsky’s Theory’ and involves
presenting a theory that is seemingly one among others. The problem is that
it is the sole entry for ‘language’ and so it is as if Chomsky’s theory was the
only one worth expounding. As usual, however, the entry has the advantage
of explicitness and clarity: it presents the philosophical core of Chomsky’s
theory to us.
The conception of language that emerges from this text, as from the most
recent articles (in this respect, Chomsky’s thinking has not developed), is that
language is a mental organ: a ‘biological endowment’ that is species-specific
and innate. Chomsky clearly establishes an analogy between language – a
mental organ – and the heart or eye – physical organs. We speak just as we
breathe, possibly without thinking about it, but certainly without ever having
learnt to. For, according to Chomsky, we no more learn to speak than we learn
to grow arms or reach puberty: language develops in the same way that our
body grows and this biological process has nothing to do with learning.
Language is like a Leibnizian monad: an innate genetic programme unfolds.
However, the analogy is not exact: whereas Leibniz’s monad possesses neither
doors nor windows, the human mind does. A certain amount of experience
is required for the genetic programme of language to be ‘triggered’: without
it, we would be in the position of wolf children who, not having been exposed
Critique of Linguistics • 19(^6) See Chomsky 2000 and Chomsky 1987.