followup conversation with Bush, the
two men had commiserated over the
missed opportunity. “What a pity,”
Bush said. “So sad they were not taken
out at the same time.”
I
n the Presidential palace in Damas
cus, Muhammad Suleiman had his
office on the same floor as President
Assad’s. Within weeks of Mughniyeh’s
death, an operation to assassinate Su
leiman was ready. In this case, Israeli
assassins would act alone. (Unlike the
U.S., Israel did not consider Syrian offi
cials off limits for targeted killings.) The
task was assigned to Shayetet 13, a spe
cialforces unit of the Israeli Navy. The
plan called for the killing of Suleiman
at his holiday retreat, overlooking the
beaches of Tartus, on Syria’s Mediter
ranean coast. In the course of the sum
mer, Israeli operatives set up hidden
video cameras, which beamed live foot
age of the home back to a command
post in Tel Aviv. Suleiman liked to spend
summer evenings entertaining on a large
terrace with a view of the sea.
On the evening of August 1, 2008,
Israeli intelligence learned that Sulei
man was on the road to Tartus. In Tel
Aviv, commanders put the assassina
tion plan into action. In the darkness,
several kilometres off the coast, an Is
raeli submarine broke the surface of
the water. Six snipers and a commander
disembarked and boarded a semisub
mersible boat. When they reached the
shore, they scattered into preplanned
positions, hiding, at a distance, on ei
ther side of the terrace. Suleiman, who
had a broad forehead and a heavy gray
mustache, was sitting next to his wife,
amid a large group of guests. Com
manders in Tel Aviv watched the scene
on television monitors. The snipers,
with silenced rifles, fired simultane
ously. “Six bullets penetrated his heart
and head, three from each side,” the
former Israeli official said. “His head
moved forward, to one side, and then
to the other side. Suddenly, there was
a spray pouring out of his head, from
both sides, on the table and on the
floor.” His wife was unharmed. Guests
recoiled and cried out in terror.
The snipers and the commander re
treated to the boat, headed back to the
submarine, and returned to an Israeli
port. Later that evening, Israeli intel
ligence intercepted a conversation be
tween Suleiman’s frenzied aides and
President Assad about the killing. “The
reaction of Assad was very interesting,”
the former Israeli official said. “You’re
talking about the closest person to him
on the most sensitive matters of the
country. And he gets a telephone call
at midnight that tells him that he was
assassinated. ... And Assad’s immedi
ate response was ‘Don’t panic. Put him
in a plastic bag. Go outside of Tartus
and bury him in a grave without any
identifying signs.’” He went on, “I was
impressed with his coolness. There was
no funeral, no event. Nothing. They
never admitted that he was killed. He
just disappeared.”
Israel would occasionally remind
Assad that he was never out of reach.
F16s had roared low over his summer
palace in Latakia, and, the former Is
raeli official said, Israeli intelligence
delivered electronic messages directly
to him. In the days that followed Su
leiman’s death, Israel said nothing as,
all the while, the assassinations bred a
sense of helplessness among those who
might be next on the list. Assad’s se
curity advisers selected a secret refuge
for him, but, in intercepted communi
cations, he was heard belittling the plan
with weary resignation: “If the Israe
lis want, they will come to that place.
Why waste the money, and why make
the effort?”
I
n the decision to kill, notoriety can
cut both ways: there is little benefit to
targeting militants with limited power,
yet the deaths of highprofile opponents
can have deep repercussions. Born in 1957
in Kerman Province, in southeastern Iran,
Qassem Suleimani was a farmer’s son
who spent most of his time at the gym
and at the mosque. He worked at the
local water department, and, in the nine
teeneighties, during the war between
Iran and Iraq, he was tasked with get
ting water delivered to the front lines.
He fulfilled his duties with courage and
climbed the ranks. But, to the C.I.A. an
alysts who kept track of rising officers
in the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Su
leimani did not stand out. Around 1998,
he became head of its expeditionary unit,
the Quds Force. Danny Yatom, a former
head of Mossad, said, “We started to col
lect information about him.”
In Israel, the list of potential assassi
nation targets is assembled from multi
ple sources. Occasionally, the former Is
raeli official said, a Prime Minister will
take note of media coverage and ask Mos
sad, “What about him? Are we capable
of doing something to him? Can we reach
