The Economist 29Feb2020

28 United States The EconomistFebruary 29th 2020

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Promises are expensive. Our account-

ing shows Mr Sanders proposing $52trn in

additional spending over a decade—al-

though some plans, like a federal jobs-

guarantee, are impossible to price. He has

proposed some revenue-raisers: the wealth

tax, and a significant rise in payroll taxes

for the middle class. But these look likely to

cover just $24trn of the cost. Even this esti-

mate is rosy. It assumes that nationalising

the generation of clean electricity, rather

than costing money, will raise $6.4trn;

$4.4trn from a wealth tax that the Euro-

pean experience shows the rich are good at

avoiding; and $2.4trn from a financial-

transactions tax (the Tax Policy Centre, a

think-tank, estimates that the maximum

possible revenue is one-quarter as much).

Perhaps the Green New Deal is not as

grand as all that, and the 20m jobs he antic-

ipates do not materialise. Taking his maths

as given, however, Mr Sanders seems to be

setting himself up for additional annual

deficits of $2.8trn per year, or 13% of cur-

rent gdp. Given that one of his senior eco-

nomic advisers is Stephanie Kelton, a pro-

ponent of “modern monetary theory”

whose forthcoming book is called “The

Deficit Myth”, this may not be a concern.

Gimme, gimme, gimme

All these plans would need assent from

Congress, which looks highly unlikely at

the moment. But though Congress can tie

the hands of the president on domestic

matters, foreign affairs are less circum-

scribed. Some Democrats bristle at the

thought of Mr Sanders at the helm of the

national-security apparatus. Like old-

school leftists, Mr Sanders has appeared

blind to the horrible things left-wing gov-

ernments have done to their own citizens

in the name of solidarity—a tendency that

will be a gift to Republican makers of at-

tack-ads if he becomes the nominee. In the

1980s he campaigned for the Socialist

Workers Party, which sought “the abolition

of capitalism.” Mr Sanders wrote praise to

the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and attended

a rally there on a visit in 1985 featuring the

chant, “Here, there, everywhere, the Yan-

kee will die.”

More recently, Mr Sanders has pledged

not to use America’s military might for re-

gime change, either overtly or covertly. Nor

would he use it to secure American oil sup-

plies. He has promised to use force only

with congressional approval. His scepti-

cism of America’s global role echoes Do-

nald Trump’s, and has led some to carica-

ture him as a left-wing isolationist.

That is not quite right. On the stump

and in campaign materials, Mr Sanders has

called for a foreign policy centred on hu-

man rights, economic fairness, democracy,

diplomacy and peace. For voters of a cer-

tain age, that rhetoric may conjure up ech-

oes of Jimmy Carter’s human-rights-fo-

cused foreign policy. But some of his

advisers say Mr Sanders’s foreign policy

would be more like Barack Obama’s.

He shares Mr Obama’s belief in talking

to America’s opponents, and said he will

continue Mr Trump’s personal dialogues

with Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader. He

also wants to re-enter the nuclear deal with

Iran. He would probably try to reset—to use

an unlucky word—America’s relationships

with Russia and China. Like his Democratic

rivals, he has vowed to re-join the Paris Cli-

mate Agreement, and wants America to

take a leading role in combating climate

change. He does not share Mr Trump’s hos-

tility towards nato, and is unlikely to set

out to further erode the country’s alliances.

Mr Sanders has recently said that he would

honour Article vcommitments to nato

members, including for countries that do

not meet their commitment to spend 2% of

gdpon defence.

The president is also relatively unfet-

tered in matters of trade policy. Like Mr

Trump, Mr Sanders has been sceptical of

America’s trade deals for decades. He

seems never to have found one he liked.

Not only did he vote against the deal that

ultimately brought China into the World

Trade Organisation (wto), but he also voted

for America to leave the wtoaltogether. He

has pledged to “immediately” renegotiate

the recently signed usmcaand to “funda-

mentally rewrite all of our trade deals to

deals to prevent the outsourcing of Ameri-

can jobs and raise wages.”

Mr Sanders is a more nuanced protec-

tionist than Mr Trump. His criticisms of the

uscmainclude its omission of any refer-

ences to climate change. Mr Sanders

frames his attacks on past trade deals as re-

flecting his concern with labour, environ-

mental and human-rights standards.

Though he may be less erratic than Mr

Trump and have purer intentions, his trade

policies may not have better outcomes.

Protection from foreign competition will

make it easier for domestic companies to

fatten their profit margins while providing

worse services. If and when other govern-

ments retaliate by restricting their own

markets, American workers will not be im-

mune. His tenure in office might continue

the country’s inward turn.

The presidency comes with other poli-

cy-making perks that Mr Sanders would

wield: executive action gives considerable

leeway in some domestic arenas. Some

would be the standard stuff of Democratic

administrations. Many of the Trump exec-

utive actions would be countermanded.

Those that loosened environmental pro-

tections, attempted to destabilise health-

insurance markets and tightened immigra-

tion restrictions would be the first to go.

That might all be welcome. Mr Sanders has

signalled he would also go further, banning

the export of crude oil, legalising marijua-

na and allowing the import of prescription

drugs. He would appoint heads of federal

agencies from outside the Democratic

mainstream. Taking a page from Ms War-

ren (who might occupy a post in a Sanders

administration), he could appoint zealous

enforcers for antitrust, consumer protec-

tion and labour-relations posts.

Take a chance on me

Mr Sanders’s supporters argue that this

programme is not electoral suicide but

strategic brilliance. Head-to-head polling

against Mr Trump shows Mr Sanders ahead

by 3.6 percentage points nationally. In piv-

otal states like Michigan and Wisconsin,

which Ms Clinton narrowly lost, he looks

ahead by slim margins of five and one

points, respectively.

Mr Sanders, his supporters argue,

would expand the electorate, bringing in

new and disengaged voters. His showings

in the first three states give no evidence of

such a stampede to the polls. A recent pa-

per by David Broockman and Joshua Kalla,

political scientists at Berkeley and Yale re-

spectively, found that Mr Sanders would

fare worse against Mr Trump than a moder-

ate Democrat would, in part because he

drives wavering voters away. To make up

for that loss, he would have to raise youth

turnout by 11 percentage points. To put it

another way, the proportional increase

among young voters would need to be sig-

nificantly larger than the Obama-inspired

African-American voter bump in 2008—far

above historically plausible levels.

So far Mr Sanders has dealt only with

primaries and caucuses, where his fellow

Democrats have treated him comparatively

gently, refraining from criticising his char-

acter and preferring to disagree with his

policy. Mr Trump will be less kind and re-

strained—and will amplify his attacks with

$1bn-worth, or more, of negative advertis-

ing. Whether the monied Democratic do-

nors that Mr Sanders so evidently detests

What do we want?

United States, left-leaning policy proposals

July-December 2019, %supporting*

Sources: Democracy Fund;

UCLA Nationscape; The Economist

*Excludes adults

without an opinion

Provide free insurance to

undocumented immigrants

Pay reparations for slavery

Abolish private health

insurance

Green New Deal

Decriminalise border

crossing

Medicare for all

Debt-free public college

Raise upper-class taxes

7550250