Flight International 09Mar2020

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AIR TRANSPORT


flightglobal.com 3-9 March 2020 | Flight International | 17

A changing
environment
in retirement
News Focus P

I


nvestigators in Kenya have
disclosed that the crew of a
Fokker 50 continued a take-off
roll, despite multiple alerts warn-
ing of a serious engine problem,
before the aircraft crashed some
50s after becoming airborne.
The inquiry into the 2014
accident, involving a Skyward
International Aviation turboprop
departing Nairobi’s main inter-
national airport, found that 27
high-level “triple-chime” alerts
had sounded as the aircraft rolled
along runway 06.
Aural alerts had commenced
as early as 8s after the take-off
was initiated but, while the air-
craft was well below the V1 deci-
sion speed, the crew did not act
to abort the take-off roll.
Flight-data recorder informa-
tion indicates that the left-hand
Pratt & Whitney Canada PW
engine was exhibiting problems,
with increasing torque but
declining propeller speed com-
pared with the right-hand engine.

INQUIRY DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

Fokker 50 crew ignored multiple alerts


Skyward turboprop sounded 27 high-level ‘triple-chime’ warnings during take-off roll before 2014 fatal crash at Nairobi


K


azakhstan’s government has
released an animation detail-
ing the take-off sequence of the
Bek Air Fokker 100 involved in a
fatal accident at Almaty.
The sequence shows the diffi-
culties the crew had in controlling
the aircraft as it rotated from run-
way 05R while departing for Nur-
Sultan airport on 27 December.
It oscillated on lift-off but failed
to gain altitude, striking the run-
way several times before overrun-
ning and veering into a building.
Icing remains the suspected
cause of the aircraft failing to be-
come airborne.
Bek Air was grounded after
the  accident and has repeatedly
appealed to authorities to allow it
to restart operations. The airline
recently issued, extraordinarily,

Carrier was grounded immediately after the fatal accident last year

Vladimir Zaikin/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

was the captain’s decision,
because it could not be checked
from the ground.
The first officer also says that
the aircraft was able to track the
runway centreline during the
departure but had passed the V
decision speed when problems
emerged, and the crew therefore

purported audio conversations
between accident investigators
and the first officer of the flight,
who initially survived the acci-
dent but passed away on 28 Janu-
ary, shortly after the discussion.
Bek Air says the recordings
were captured by airline employ-
ees who were present.
The transcript of the discus-
sion includes a question on how
the crew checked the surface of
the wings for ice.
The first officer apparently
replies that he made a tactile
check in three places, saying that
he was able to check the front of
the wing – which was “clean and
dry” – more easily because he
was taller than the captain.
He says the de-icing of the sta-
biliser – and only the stabiliser –

INVESTIGATION DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

Animation shows Bek Air Almaty crash sequence


did not consider aborting the
take-off roll.
Control difficulties began, he
says, after the nose-wheel lifted.
He retracted the landing-gear, but
only on the second attempt – and
after a second call from the
captain – because the aircraft was
rolling sharply. ■

“On [its] ground roll for take-
off, the aircraft seemed to take
[more] runway than anticipated
before attaining the take-off
speed,” the Kenyan air accident
investigation department states,
indicating that the roll lasted
more than 90s.
The aircraft lifted off from the
high-elevation airport at about
100kt (185km/h) but was “barely
climbing”, the inquiry says,
reaching no more than 50ft above
ground after about 20s while con-
tinually deviating to the left of
the extended centreline.
It subsequently collided with a
building 2,100m (6,890ft) north-
northeast of the runway end.
None of the four occupants – two
pilots, an engineer and a load-
master – survived.
The aircraft had been conduct-
ing a cargo service to Mogadishu,
in darkness, on 2 July 2014.
Investigators found discrepan-
cies in the loadsheet for the aircraft
and analysis of the cargo, including

a shipment of the mild narcotic
qat, indicated that the aircraft was
500-1,500kg (1,100-3,300lb) above
its maximum certificated gross
weight at take-off.
The captain, who had been
flying, had logged more than
6,800h in command of Fokker
50s, although the inquiry says
it  was “unable to determine”
whether either pilot had demon-
strated an ability to fly the turbo-
prop with one engine inoperable.
Analysis of recordings from
the previous positioning flight by
the aircraft (5Y-CET) showed a
“three-chime” alert had occurred,
and that the crew had spent time
trying to diagnose the problem.
Despite the evidence from the
cockpit-voice recorder, the moni-
toring pilot for the flight “denied
knowledge” of any anomalies,
says the inquiry.
Investigators could not obtain
any evidence that any problem
was recorded in the technical
log, nor that any maintenance

was conducted in relation to the
apparent anomaly. At least one
of the crew members – possibly
the captain – from the position-
ing flight was among those
fatally injured during the subse-
quent accident.
While the “three-chime” alert
sounded repeatedly during the
ill-fated flight’s take-off roll, the
inquiry says “it is not clear” why
the crew continued to proceed
with the flight.
Cirium fleets data shows the
aircraft was originally delivered
to Lufthansa CityLine in 1992
and served with Air Nostrum and
Avianca Brazil before being trans-
ferred to Skyward from Dutch
operator Denim in May 2014.
It had been operated in Kenya for
just 92h before the crash.
Although the accident oc-
curred in 2014, the inquiry was
signed off only at the end of
November last year and pub-
lished by the transport ministry
in January. ■
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