RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIESThe Khawarij also affirmed the qadar of God. Some of them ac-
cepted the concept that a person's last acts justified his spiritual fate
and asserted that God created both good and evil. Associations be-
tween fatalism and the damnation of children also resurfaced among
the Khawarij. The Azariqa justified killing the children of unbelievers
by saying that the children of believers and of unbelievers went to
Heaven or Hell, respectively. But 'Abd al-Karim ibn 'Ajarrad, in the
early eighth century, who refused to make God responsible for evil,
said that the children of unbelievers would share their parents' fate
but that the children of believers should be treated with "disassocia-
tion" (Ar. barii'a) until they had reached an age of accountability and
had been given the opportunity to profess Islam for themselves. One
of his followers went so far as to say that one should be neutral toward
the children of believers and of unbelievers alike until they had been
summoned to Islam and decided for themselves.^59
This shift of attitude is important because it contains an awareness
that personal choice is necessary at the very least in order to preserve
God's justice and human responsibility. It seems to coincide with the
use of divine determinism to justify the regime of 'Abd al-Malik and
may have been in reaction to it. To those who began to use such
arguments in the 690s, the supporters of the regime were capable of
being either good or evil by their own choice, they were responsible
for their sins, unworthy of rule, and they ought to be opposed by
conscientious Muslims.
In a letter he wrote to 'Abd al~Malik between 695 and 700, al-
l:Iasan al-Ba~ri stated his opposition, for both political and ethical
reasons, to making God responsible for evil. AI-l:Iasan asserted God's
control and determination of material existence, His providence for
His creatures, and His guidance of those who choose to acknowledge
Him. But he denied that oppression and tyranny were decreed by God.
Guidance came from God but error was one's own doing and God
was not responsible if people did what he forbade. AI-l:Iasan empha-
sized God's justice and argued that He would not make people do
what He had ordered them not to do; nor would He require them to
do things they were incapable of doing. God gave people the capability
(Ar. qudra) to believe, to do good or evil, and consequently to deserve
Heaven or Hell. Although he admitted that God had an eternal fore-
knowledge of what people would choose, people still could choose
S9 Salem, Khawarij, pp. 40-41; Montgomery Watt, Free Will, pp. 37-40, 56; idem,
Formative Period, pp. 34, 96.