THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973that appeared to reflect preparation for renewed fighting : for one thing, fishing in the
canal was forbidden. “Not long ago furloughs were reduced in duration and fre-
quency,” to counteract officer absenteeism that reached as high as 30 to 40 percent.
This initially aroused resentment: “the [Eg yptian] officers are blaming us. ... Even the
division commander hinted that this was at the advisers’ behest.”
The Soviets received specific notice when two SAM-2 batteries were advanced into
the canal zone on 3 March, along with their advisers.^30 But several testimonies indi-
cate that at least the precise timing of the cannonade was not known in advance to
the higher-echelon advisers—possibly to avoid their predictable demand for even
better preparation.
Serkov and some other advisers were absent when the bombardment began—as
usual, on a Saturday. They were in Cairo, attending a celebration of International
Women’s Day, presumably in honor of their wives. Malashenko’s memoir appears to
suggest deliberate Eg yptian evasion: Riad, he writes, usually took him along on all his
inspections of the front. But this time, on Sunday, “we learned that an exchange of
artillery fire was being prepared on the canal. The same day, I called Riad to coordi-
nate our departure ... to check preparedness and observe results of the duel.” But that
night the Soviet headquarters’ duty officer reported that the Eg yptian chief of staff
had been killed two hours earlier, on the road to Port Said, when his car was struck.
“It was only by chance that I was not in the same car.”
This seems an almost excessive effort to dissociate from the Eg yptian action: it was
highly unusual for no Soviet adviser at all to be in Riad’s retinue.^31 In particular, since
this was the second day of heavy fighting, Malashenko could hardly have just “learned
of preparations for a duel” that had already begun. And contrary to this initial version
that Malashenko received, the Eg yptian general was killed when a Z e’ev scored a
direct hit on a front-line outpost that he was visiting.
Whether or not they colluded in setting the zero hour, once the shooting began
there is little evidence to back Israeli claims at the time that Soviet opposition caused
“clashes and arguments between the Soviet advisers and the Eg yptian officers ... the
advisers’ situation is pretty difficult. They are caught between loyalty to the Soviet
line of awaiting a political settlement and the aid that the Eg yptian army expects.”^32
Actually, it was again enthusiastic advisers who pressed hesitant Eg yptians for more
aggressive action.
Serkov and his colleagues reported immediately back to “their” units. As the artil-
lery duel continued, at “a SAM divizyon deployed very close to the canal north of
Suez City,” the interpreter Isaenko “arrived with an adviser surnamed Sharashkin,
who—it must be said—was a wise and determined man. ... He would not only advise
but demonstrate how things should be done.” Isaenko describes the scene that ensued
in the missiles’ control cabin:
The SAM divizyon’s radar detected a target flying low over the east bank. It turned out to
be an artillery observer flying along the canal with impunity. Our adviser suggested to the