THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973during two days of shelling than the Eg yptians did in the Riad incident alone. This
even though “the Eg yptian artillerymen were shown to be better prepared” and
despite the disparity in guns and in ammunition expended. Serkov counted a total of
only 120 rounds fired from the Israeli side at Ismailia on the 9th, presumably includ-
ing the Z e’evs, but this was enough to cause “the worst damage yet.” He observed “big
explosions, which darkened the city with smoke. Fires broke out. Our artillerymen
fired quite intensively but could not silence the enemy.”
Indeed, the Bar-Lev Line’s bunkers were now stronger than the Eg yptians’ fortifi-
cations—as proved by Riad’s fate. Within a few days of the first barrage, Serkov saw
“papers being drawn up urgently for improving the defenses.” By the fourth day of
dueling, the II Army Corps alone had used up 25,500 shells, and “the results were
effectively very minor.” Such damage as was inflicted on the IDF was mostly on con-
voys and other exposed targets between the strongpoints. The latter—as the Israelis
now disclosed—had been reinforced with rails dismantled from the Qantara–
El-Arish track as well as layers of rock-filled wire cages.^38 When on 13 March the
firing went on and Eg yptian “official data reported that up to 30 tanks were disabled”
as well as Israeli strongpoints damaged, Serkov considered the figures to be inflated.
Civilian evacuation of Ismailia, Port Said and the other canal cities was acceler-
ated; the market where the advisers used to shop emptied. “One can’t show oneself
in the frontline positions for fear of snipers.” At Serkov’s own villa, “hiding in our
flimsy shelters made no sense.” A larger and safer shelter was built, “but it still will not
hold up against a direct hit.” They decided to remain there anyway and fortunately
suffered no casualties—for now.
Major artillery exchanges continued unabated, but neither side yet acknowledged a
substantive change. Nasser himself did not use the Arabic word for “bloodletting”—the
term usually translated as “attrition”—in two speeches at his party conference on 27
and 28 March, which (as Serkov and his colleagues were informed) were otherwise
quite warlike. He did not announce a new phase, but promised quite truthfully that “we
are doing all we can, and even more, [to prepare] for the campaign. Rest assured, we will
not start it one day too early, but also not one day too late.” Addressing workers on May
Day, Nasser still claimed only that the second stage, “active operations and acquisition
of combat experience,” had begun—with no mention of “attrition.” Although Nasser
had preceded the 8 March attack with a declaration that, due to Israeli violations, he
would no longer be bound by the ceasefire, both sides continued to complain about
violations and the UN observers kept on adjudicating them. Only on 23 July would
Nasser even predicate the ceasefire on Israeli withdrawal, and call to “prepare for a long
war of attrition” before the liberation phase could begin.^39
A Russian historian—then a correspondent in the Middle East—who dates
Nasser’s unilateral abrogation of the ceasefire at 1 April 1969 suggests that the
dynamics of events on the ground overcame any political misgivings in the USSR
about the timing : “the Soviet interest was actually in perpetuating a status of ‘no war,