THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973tions, though the presence of a radar station on the island has been denied by the
leader of the naval commando unit that led the raid.^28 The air offensive that started
the next day—the IAF’s largest ground-attack operation since the Six-Day War—
actually began at the northern end of the canal (which had only sparse SAM coverage
anyway) and was later expanded southward.^29 It has been argued that Israel’s decision,
at this point, to throw its air force into full-scale action was unforeseen by the
Eg yptians and caused their strateg y’s breakdown.^30 But Serkov’s misgivings cited
above are only one indication that such an effort by the Israelis was not entirely unex-
pected, precisely because of the Eg yptians’ relative success in the ground war. As a
Soviet adviser put it, “Israel’s patience snapped.” The accelerated attempt to reestab-
lish a SAM barrier along the canal indicates that counteracting the IAF offensive was
attempted—for now, unsuccessfully.^31
The relative immunity of Port Said thanks to the Soviet naval presence was now
ended. Two days into the Israeli offensive, a Soviet marine lieutenant posted there,
V.I. Dmitriev, witnessed an attack on Eg yptian missile boats, even though they
“nestled up to [his] BDK for shelter. One burst of aircraft [cannon] fire perforated a
UAZ-452 ambulance that was on the upper deck.”^32 The Israelis, while bannering the
success of the IAF action, took care not to mention any damage to Soviet ships.
However, it was noted that Nasser met Vinogradov the same day. Izvestiya reported
that “for the first time since 1967, the Israeli military bombarded Port Said,” and a
subsequent Israeli document quoted a Soviet note, which was delivered “through the
Finns, after Soviet ships were struck,” protesting “this attack as a provocative act
which may lead to very serious consequences.”^33
The entire IAF series of deep-penetration bombings that began on 7 January 1970
would comprise eighty-eight sorties in twenty raids spread over three months.^34 For
comparison, between July and December 1969 the Soviet advisers along the canal
sometimes counted over eighty Israeli sorties per day in a single sector. The bombard-
ment was so intense that it forced the Soviet advisers posted to Eg yptian front-line
formations to move their living quarters underground, and several were killed none-
theless.^35 Once the Israelis had effectively wiped out the Eg yptian SAM-2 batter-
ies—as Serkov noted in his journal—Eg yptian artillerymen became reluctant to fire
lest they reveal their emplacements to Israeli planes, and Israeli tanks could venture
out of their shelters to take direct aim at Eg yptian positions.^36
By August 1969, Israel’s “flying artillery” had interdicted water-obstacle training
in the canal zone, but a better facility had already been inaugurated northwest of
Cairo. Vladimir Dudchenko was an interpreter with the Soviet advisers of an infantry
brigade of the new III Army Corps. He witnessed how “in the Wadi Natrun area
irrigation system, a training ground was set up simulating a section of the Suez Canal
with fortifications of the Bar-Lev Line type, where sub-units of the Eg yptian army
conducted intensive training.”^37 By 1973, statistics compiled by IDF intelligence