THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973For lack of long-range bombers, the IAF had used its French-made Nord Aviation
Noratlas transports for the Nag Hammadi raids, dumping the bombs through the
rear cargo doors. After their narrow escape on the second try, the Israelis no longer
had to resort to such improvisation. On 5 September, the first four Phantoms had
flown in from the United States. More arrived at the rate of four a month, and by
22 October they were sent into action on the canal front, even before technical
adjustment and crew training were complete.^41 This was a matter of some concern for
the first squadron’s commander, Shmu’el Hetz. He flew the plane that the Eg yptians
claimed to have downed on 9 December, together with Menahem Eini, the squad-
ron’s senior WSO (weapons system officer, the US term; “navigator” in IAF par-
lance). Hetz and Eini would really be shot down only in July 1970.
C. Whose mission to Moscow in December 1969?
On 8 December, after another attempt to reestablish an Eg yptian SAM-2 array in the
canal zone was thwarted by the IAF, an Eg yptian delegation to Moscow was led by
Sadat, Fawzy and Riad.^42 Premier Kosygin was officially quoted as promising them
“active measures to strengthen the defense potential of the UAR.”^43 The advisers in
Eg ypt were briefed by 14 December that “in Moscow, Soviet–Eg yptian talks have
concluded. We hope that some cardinal measures are to be implemented in respect
of the inadequate condition of the air defense and air force.”^44
Others were told about a “personal request” by Nasser without mentioning any
Eg yptian mission to Moscow at all; they too describe the preparations for dispatching
the SAM division as already in full swing by December.^45 Riad later quoted Brezhnev
as stating to Sadat’s party that sixty Soviet pilots were ready to leave for Eg ypt within
a month, and promising to send SAM-3 detachments—almost precisely the commit-
ments that supposedly were obtained by Nasser only in January.^46 Indeed, multiple
Russian sources still describe the Eg yptian delegation in December as led by Nasser
himself. This version was most recently reiterated by the deputy head of the Russian
Defense Ministry’s Military History Institute, Valery Vartanov.^47 Post-Soviet journal-
ists who interviewed veterans about their service in the Middle East, and evidently
consulted standard Russian reference works for background, dated Nasser’s visit in
December as a matter of fact.^48
If that was the case, the official Eg yptian announcement that Sadat, Fawzy and
Riad only reported to Nasser after returning from Moscow on 12 December was
fabricated to disguise a secret trip by the president himself.^49 But Nasser would hardly
have passed through Moscow, even under the strictest secrecy, without being exam-
ined by the trusted Chazov. The latter, however, not only mentions no such visit, but
positively states that he did not see Nasser until the following summer. The doctor
only notes disapprovingly that Nasser disobeyed his orders from September.
This occurred when Nasser visited the new revolutionary regime in Libya on