OPERATION KAVKAZ IS FORMALLY ORGANIZEDment of needles and thread that never arrived.^19 Strictures were eventually relaxed
somewhat at the top level and away from the front. In 1971, an interpreter who had
spent a year on the canal was delighted at his transfer to a Soviet general at headquarters
in Cairo, with whom he “could ride a Volga [car] in civvies.”^20
The Soviet soldiers “were not allowed to mention their places of service in the
letters they wrote home.”^21 Even in 1972, Danakan Nurgaliev, a sergeant in a SAM
unit from the Far Eastern Amur region, was not told of his destination until his group
embarked, disguised as “sports instructors.” If when writing home they mentioned
their top-secret location, “censorship would return the letter.”^22 The return address
given to their families was “Moscow 400,” and some parents thought it was a military
prison.^23 The photos they now display of their activities and outposts in Eg ypt—
unlike the formal group portraits of the Eg yptian and Soviet brass—were taken sur-
reptitiously, against orders, and smuggled back home—as one serviceman describes,
“under the lining of a suitcase.”^24
This denial was never formally abandoned. The appellation of “advisers” or
“experts” stuck to the SAM crews and other regulars in part because “officially,
Moscow was declaring that there were advisers present in Eg ypt, but not troops.”^25 In
his initial briefing to the commanders of Kavkaz, Grechko warned the airmen: “if you
fly across the Canal or Gulf [of Suez] you’re no longer ours.” As events would prove,
this did not mean that no such operations would be undertaken—only that any
captured pilot would be repudiated.^26
Such situations, however, would occur only later. By the end of January 1970, the
entire MiG-21 contingent had been deployed in underground shelters at five air bases
in Eg ypt, and on 1 February they were first assigned to operational but distinctly
defensive duty. The mission for Nastenko’s unit was initially to cover the naval bases
and industrial centers along the Mediterranean coast from Alexandria to Mersa
Matruh and south as far as Cairo. The other regiment was to defend Cairo from the
east, as well as industrial centers down to the Aswan Dam.^27
An unsourced version by a reputable IAF pilot and historian holds that “in early
February,” US intelligence agents in Turkey were surprised to spot Soviet naval vessels
hauling SAMs and MiGs through the Bosporus. This account appears to have been
embellished in transmission, as the agents supposedly made out through binoculars
not only the ships’ cargo, under camouflage nets on deck, but also “many officers
wearing pilots’ wings and Air Defense insignia.” Such disregard for secrecy would
have contravened the Soviets’ strict instructions. Likewise, Israeli and Western
accounts, presumably in order to explain the Soviet anti-aircraft formations’ appear-
ance so soon after Nasser’s purported visit, describe their arrival as another massive
airlift. But “the noise of a simultaneous Soviet airlift” could not have been heard “over
the [US] agents’ heads,” since the routine Soviet flight path to Eg ypt did not overfly
Turkey. At any rate, if “a few hours later word spread through CIA corridors that a