The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

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THE SOVIET–ISRAELI BATTLE IS JOINED


A. First air encounters


Once again, a Soviet move had been threatened when it was already being imple-
mented. On 12 April, IAF reconnaissance reported that several of the “T emplace-
ments” had been occupied, and although it was assumed that they were manned by
Soviet regulars, Israel now abandoned its previous caution not to engage them. Two
Phantoms were dispatched on a bombing raid, and reported that the Soviets appeared
to be unprepared as no missiles were fired. This marked the first direct clash of the
Soviet–Israeli war in which both sides were aware of each other’s identity.^1 It ushered
in the pitched battle between Soviet and Israeli forces, which was to last just under
four months.
The United States gave scant support for Israel’s effort to prevent the Soviet SAM
shield from reaching the canal bank and extending its range into Sinai. For the Nixon
administration, highlighting this Soviet advance was undesirable, and Israel’s alleged
role in provoking it was resented. If the Soviet military presence in Eg ypt could no
longer be averted, at least the political damage could be limited by not advertising it.
In Washington, the view remained the same as before the Soviet SAMs were detected:
“unacknowledged Soviet involvement in the defense of the UAR does not directly
affect US interests,” whereas “forcing the USSR into open support would be forcing
the extension of the Brezhnev doctrine into the Middle East and extending the area
of dominant Soviet influence.”^2
Despite the Soviet MiG squadrons’ initial assignment to the Eg yptian rear, Nastenko
anticipated that their clash with the Israelis was also just a matter of time. He took chief
military adviser Katyshkin’s indoctrination seriously: “We had to prepare for dogfights
with Israeli pilots of American origin, with rich experience, who had been trained at a
war school in Vietnam.” Training for such encounters was facilitated after Nastenko
noticed, on the desk of the Eg yptian base commander, a thick manual graphically
describing previous dogfights against Israeli aircraft. He persuaded the Eg yptian to
share this vital material only after agreeing that the latter would read it to him and he
would take no notes. “For two weeks, for no longer than an hour per day, I listened to

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