THE SOVIET–ISRAELI BATTLE IS JOINEDlaration that bannered the Soviet intervention.^17 In retrospect, Israeli officials claimed
rather unconvincingly that this was done to signal to the Soviets that Israel did not
desire a confrontation.^18 However, the main target was clearly American: the com-
muniqué was backed up, confidentially, with Masregah’s “daily recordings of Russian
operational conversations” relayed by the Mossad to “contacts in Washington.” But
even this failed to force the US hand in respect of public diplomacy or accelerated
arms supply.
When this Mossad initiative was leaked to, and broadcast by, the Israel Radio
correspondent in Washington, it did little to promote Israel’s case but caused inter-
necine feuding that further shackled its advocacy: Mossad chief Zamir “stopped
sending sensitive information” to all diplomatic missions. Israel’s ambassador in
London (a former IAF commander), frustrated that “I am not getting even a mini-
mum of trust” with evidence that might help his efforts, reported that the British too
were “blaming this [Soviet intervention] on our deep-penetration policy.”^19
The chastised Israelis never again tried to rub American noses in the presence of
Soviet regulars. Subsequent Israeli statements referred only to Eg yptian planes and
missiles. It remained the elephant at the tea party, very much present but rarely men-
tioned, hidden behind such euphemisms as “experts” or “technicians,” which then
became interchangeable with “advisers,” despite the substantial difference. Approved
Israeli versions featured the oxymoron that “Russian ‘advisers’ stationed in Eg ypt”
then numbered more than 10,000, “and they alone were to man and protect the
top-secret SAM-3 installations.”^20 This, in turn, helped vested-interest sources to
shape mainstream historiography when the Soviet regulars were withdrawn.
In later years, as the Israelis were unable to disprove the link between their depth
bombings and the Soviet intervention, their publications tried to harmonize it with
the Israeli position while accepting Nasser’s January visit as fact. Here is one such
gloss from early 1973, which in retrospect came closest to an accurate assessment:
the Russians decided at the end of 1969 to supply Eg ypt with SAM-3s. The Israeli bomb-
ings deep inside Eg ypt, which came after this had already been decided, convinced the
Soviets all the more of this matter’s urgency. This was added to by Nasser’s appeal during
his secret visit to Moscow at the beginning of 1970, when he succeeded in persuading the
Soviets to accelerate increased military aid and Soviet units.^21An official IDF publication in late 1971 tried to reconcile the two versions:
Nasser’s “secret” visit to Moscow and his appeal for Soviet help are described as
caused by the devastating Israeli air counteroffensive along the canal, before the depth
bombings. But only after another appeal from Nasser, in March 1970, did the USSR
“begin the construction of a new AA array, manned by Soviet crews.”^22
After Heikal’s memoirs gained currency, the Israeli line became that
the closed character of both countries ... makes it very difficult to get a clear picture of that
critical meeting between Nasser and the Soviet leadership. Detailed descriptions were