The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

given by Heikal and Minister of War Fawzy, both of whom are of course suspect of distor-

tion, but in the main the report seems prima facie reasonable ... [though Fawzy] blurred,

apparently on purpose, between the discussions in late December and the situation that

was created after the depth bombings.^23

Even such reservations were gradually dropped or limited to footnotes—in Israeli
studies and all the more so in foreign ones—as the Eg yptian–Israeli clash faded from
the news after 1973, and Heikal’s version became the standard. Korn’s long-definitive
study of the War of Attrition reproduces the Heikal–Fawzy account of Nasser’s visit
after describing the entire depth bombing campaign, implying that it drove Nasser to
this move.^24 Fifteen years after his aforementioned endorsement of the Eg yptian
version, Quandt’s subsequent, broader history added only in a footnote that there
were opposing views.^25 As late as 2000, a detailed timeline and analysis of the
Eg yptian–Israeli confrontation gave the January–visit version as undisputed, resting
only on the Eg yptian sources.^26 The official military history published in Eg ypt soon
after the 1973 war also put the “start of intensive work” on the SAM array at January
1970, and in one of its few allusions to any Soviet role, admits that “our engineers had
at their disposal the useful knowhow of our friends in the Warsaw Pact.”^27
If the main objective of Operation Kavkaz was to block IAF deep penetration into
the Eg yptian heartland, it was achieved by mid-April 1970. Nasser had supposedly
requested the stationing of Soviet personnel in the first place only for this purpose,
and as a stopgap until sufficient Eg yptian crews could be trained. He reportedly
envisaged a two-year transition. But even the originally defined mission of protecting
the skies over Cairo and the delta necessitated blocking Israeli penetration through
the canal zone, and the dogged preparation of SAM-3 sites there—which began
before the missiles’ own arrival—confirms that this was the original plan. There are
several indications that the Soviet presence in Eg ypt was intended from the outset
also to advance the long-term goal of a cross-canal offensive. Moreover, the Soviet
troops’ dispatch was accompanied in the Soviet military press by calls for maintaining
permanent bases in the Mediterranean arena as necessary for defense of the USSR
itself.^28 The number of men screened and selected for the expeditionary force in the
summer of 1969 was adequate for several tours of duty.
An eyewitness account describes Grechko as initiating the SAM’s advance into the
canal zone. A staff officer who accompanied Air Defense Commander Batitsky when
he reported to the defense minister on 10 May about the progress of Kavkaz relates that
Grechko was satisfied with the exclusion of IAF planes from the Eg yptian hinterland,
but pointed out “a weakness in the canal area.” He reckoned that another four to five
divizyons would have to be posted there. When Batitsky protested that he had no more
units to dispatch without dereliction of his duty to protect the USSR, Grechko over-
ruled him, and a tense confrontation ensued. The upshot was evidently to send the
batteries already in Eg ypt forward, rather than to send additional formations.^29