“A FAMOUS INDISCRETION” AS THE AIR WAR PEAKSSo for US consumption, the Soviet leadership’s talks with Nasser had produced a
very different line from the one he proclaimed in Cairo. Meeting Kissinger on 7 Ju ly,
Dobrynin—who had already complained that the back-channel talks were producing
little more substance than those with Rogers and Sisco^35 —was quick to take Kissinger
to task for the “expulsion” remark. As Kissinger reported, “he couldn’t understand why
we made the statements. ... [he said] it would have been better for us to keep quiet.”
Still, Kissinger found Dobrynin “obviously taken aback by the various comments that
had been made about the Middle East,” for which Kissinger took implied credit.^36
Speaking with Nixon the same evening, he described Dobrynin as “frightened.”^37
D. The SAMs turn the tide; a limited US response
If this reliably described Dobrynin’s behavior rather than Kissinger’s wishful think-
ing, the Soviet diplomat must have put on a convincing charade, as there was little
cause for such fright. On the ground, Smirnov’s SAMs had just scored another kill.
The Soviets’ newly mobile tactics made it difficult for the Israelis to determine
whether emplacements previously spotted as occupied would—if attacked the next
day—still contain real missiles, dummies, or nothing at all, while still being protected
by cannon and Strelas. On 5 July, a massive IAF strike was partly wasted on decoys,
and was aborted after paying dearly for meager results. “A second Phantom crashed
into the Eg yptian ground like a flaming torch. It was shot down by the divizyon of
Maj. S.K. Zavesnitsky. A third Phantom was luckier that day, and though leaving a
trail of fire and smoke it managed to get across the canal.” The latter claim was not
confirmed by the IAF, and possibly was another case of afterburner activation being
described as a missile impact.
As for the Phantom that was downed, Israeli versions still vary over whether it was
struck by missile or cannon fire.^38 Both crewmen were captured, and told after their
release in 1973 that they landed in an Eg yptian emplacement. After an officer rescued
them from “hysterical” soldiers, they were taken into a shelter and were surprised to
encounter “a Soviet crew. Till then it wasn’t known in Israel that the Russians were
fighting in the actual war.” The pilot, Amos Zamir, recalls that the Soviet officer took
special interest in his WSO (weapons system officer), Amos Levitov, “because [the
Soviet] decided that [Levitov] had Russian facial features. The atmosphere was
relaxed. The officer never stopped talking on the telephone and sounded pleased with
himself.” As Levitov remembers it, “two big Russians were sitting there, in Eg yptian
military uniforms. A small Eg yptian major was sitting between the two, talking on
the phone excitedly.” As the pilot related, “we were treated decently” and handed over
to the Eg yptians.^39
The next day, US officials rejected the Israelis’ claim of Soviet involvement, and still
insisted that “the Soviets clearly were impressed by the American warnings and have not
advanced the SAM-3 missiles up to the canal, in order to avoid a direct clash with Israeli