THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973consist of the EW crew already in Israel. It had five days, before the IAF’s schedule for
the next major assault on the SAM array, to install the new pods and instruct the
Israelis in the system’s operational doctrine, which had been developed in the
Vietnam arena. No training flights were held, and the haste was to prove fatal.
Meanwhile, addressing air crews and their families on Air Force Day (16 July) after
meeting Edmundson, Dayan (who was usually the most cautious in the Israeli leader-
ship in respect of provoking Moscow), demonstrated his unpredictability by issuing an
explicit threat to attack Katameya and Salahiya, two of the forward airstrips the Soviets
were using west of the canal. To his surprised spokesman, he explained that this was
necessary to boost morale, though in practice “there’s no point in escalating the situa-
tion and losing more pilots.” Dayan was undoubtedly aware of continuing preparations
for a major strike at Soviet targets—but at the SAMs rather than the airbases.^53
On Saturday, 18 July, two formations of four Phantoms each, fitted for the first
time with the new EW pods, flew into what became the climactic engagement of
their duel with the Soviet SAMs. The first foursome was led by Shmu’el Hetz, Israel’s
top F-4 pilot and a brilliant officer who was widely considered in line for command
of the IAF. His colleagues and subordinates recall Hetz’s misgivings about the
instructions of the leading USAF expert, Maj. Dave Brog, which called for flying in
at high altitude and trusting the system for protection. Versions still vary as to
whether the Israelis ignored Brog’s guidance, or implemented it imperfectly—or the
pods simply didn’t work.