The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

dent and temporary successor, Sadat.^61 The latter welcomed the appointment and
promised regular weekly meetings with the new envoy.^62 Together with Zakharov,
Lashchenko and Katyshkin, Vinogradov took part in a military consultation with the
Eg yptian leadership. According to Heikal, Defense Minister Fawzy stressed to the
guests that “Eg yptian forces should have full confidence in the continued flow of
Soviet weapons.”

Zakharov promised to do what he could, though he thought the shopping list ... was too

big. He also said ... we should make every effort to get all Russians in Eg ypt replaced by

Eg yptians before the battle started. “Not that we are in any way afraid for our men here,”

he said, “but we think it is much better that you should take over completely.”^63

Two years later, this handover to adequately trained Eg yptians would be presented
as a sign of the Soviets’ disapproval for launching an offensive and their banishment
by Eg ypt for withholding the necessary arms. But for the moment, neither the cease-
fire nor Nasser’s death signaled any downscaling, let alone termination, of the Soviet
military presence or its commitment to preparing the ultimate “battle.”
In late August, a State Department official shared with an Israeli diplomat reports
that Soviet arms shipments to Eg ypt by air and sea had actually increased, including
additional Shilkas and possibly 203mm cannon. The Americans, the Israeli reported,
“are wondering what this considerable buildup is intended for. In his opinion, the
Eg yptians are incapable of crossing the canal and digging in on the other side, despite
the amphibious equipment they received, unless this is done with the participation
of Soviet forces in large numbers.”^64
Sgt Rogozhinsky’s spetskomandirovka (special mission) reinforcement had only
reached Nikolaev when the ceasefire came into effect, and was delayed there for two
months. On 13 October, the 350 spetsnaz men, in civvies but with weapons and
ammo concealed in their luggage, boarded the liner Armenia for Alexandria and
reported to Inshas air base, together with several replacement pilots. “Our main
mission was to teach the Arabs to operate our technical equipment. ... Their officers
were inferior to our privates. ... They couldn’t cope with contemporary hardware. Our
officers used to joke that if war were still conducted on horseback, the Eg yptians
could teach the Israelis a lesson.”^65
Okunev formally took over from Katyshkin in early 1971. His previous post—
commander of the Moscow Air Defense District—underlined the SAMs’ continuing
prominence in Kavkaz. As Kapitanets (newly appointed deputy commander of the
Fifth Eskadra) was instructed, “in case of emergency” it too was to come under
Okunev’s command, stressing Eg ypt’s centrality to the Mediterranean squadron’s
mission. At the ceasefire, by Kapitanets’s reckoning, Operation Kavkaz included—
besides the original Air Defense division—four Air Defense brigades, several inde-
pendent battalions, eleven electronic-warfare units as well as “radio-technic,” signals
and intelligence detachments. The aviation component comprised two interceptor