RETURN OF THE FOXBATSprepare a new war with Israel.”^14 Ten days later, the Daily Telegraph’s John Bulloch,
who would become a frequent channel for disinformation, reported from Beirut that
the mysterious items were “apparently Su-11s,” describing them as superior to the
F-4.^15 It took another week for US officials to admit that the planes flown into Eg ypt
might have included a small number of Foxbats or Floggers “capable of successfully
facing the Phantom,” and that these might be flown by Soviet pilots.^16
The next day, the world press bannered definitive news of the Foxbats’ deployment,
and the Israeli media dealt with little else. “State Department sources” finally admit-
ted that the Soviets “may have flown a few disassembled ‘MiG-23s’ to Eg ypt,” implic-
itly blaming Israel that this was done “in view of the almost total standstill in diplo-
matic efforts.” The officials maintained that there was no conclusive evidence
yet—despite other reports the same day about “‘MiG-23’ test flights in the Middle
E a s t .”^17 The US sources still held that although this development would intensify the
Soviets’ involvement, as only they would fly the Foxbats, the number of craft would
be limited as few of them existed and had first been deployed in the western USSR
only the previous year. The Pentagon reportedly saw this mainly as a gesture to high-
light Soviet support for Eg ypt.
But the same considerations were seen by Israeli pundits as a cause for alarm rather
than reassurance. They stressed the superiority of the “MiG-23” over the Phantom,
and pointed out (correctly) that the F-15 was being developed to counter the Foxbat
but would be ready only in the mid-1970s.^18 And most perceptively, the Foxbats were
viewed as part of a coordinated Eg yptian–Soviet response in case Israel reacted to
Sadat’s abrogation of the ceasefire with a preemptive attack.^19
The reminiscences of the 63rd Air Group’s pilots appear to indicate—though not
yet to prove—that as in 1967, their flights were at least initially designed as a deliber-
ate provocation to draw such an Israeli strike, with the RBs’ bombing capability to be
part of the response. But at the time, although the Foxbats’ deployment “caused
widespread concern in the West,” this was mainly due to their spying function. Their
possible combat role had already been discounted as “largely symbolic” and bombing
missions were not taken into consideration at all.^20 As for the MiG-25’s unequalled
combination of armed reconnaissance, “the Israelis proposed an engine upgrade for
their F-4E ... to increase altitude for an improved reconnaissance aircraft that could
reach 78,000 feet [and Mach 3.2]. Known as Project Peace Jack, this aircraft could
have carried air-to-air missiles ... In the event this so-called F-4X modification was
not made,” and the Foxbat remained unchallenged for more than another decade.^21
On 12 April (the day that the Foxbats’ appearance in Eg ypt dominated the Middle
Eastern news), Rabin finally presented to Kissinger—pointedly sidestepping the State
Department—an Israeli proposal for an interim settlement. It was still irreconcilable
with Eg yptian and Soviet demands, but its very promulgation represented a consider-
able shift after lengthy domestic debate.^22 Kissinger, however, was unimpressed and
referred the Israeli ambassador back to the State Department, which took to it more