THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973D. Moscow approves an ambitious canal crossing—and sends an official emissary to Israel
Despite any mutual suspicion, it was after signing the friendship treaty that Sadat
issued his formal order to start preparations for war. An Eg yptian general who was to
lead an infantry charge across the canal detailed, in a 1998 lecture to Soviet and
Eg yptian veterans, how “Eg ypt decided in favor of a military solution to the prob-
lem”: Sadat’s directive included military and political diversionary actions, which had
evidently begun with his offer to Rogers and would climax in the summer of 1972.^28
The Soviets not only endorsed and enabled the Eg yptian offensive plan, which was
based on their blueprint; the Eg yptians later claimed to have secured Moscow’s back-
ing for a version that was much more ambitious than what the more sober-minded
among them believed they were capable of achieving. General Shazly, chief of para-
troops and special forces, was appointed chief of staff in the shakeup of May 1971. By
July, he presented what he describes as his idea for the anti-Israeli offensive to his
predecessor Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq—now promoted to minister of war to replace
Fawzy. Sadiq was “convinced that when we did launch our offensive it had to be
forceful and unlimited: a clean, swift sweep through Sinai and the Gaza Strip.” Sadiq
believed that “if the Soviet Union supplied us with what we needed ... we could
launch the offensive inside a year, perhaps less.” Shazly was much less optimistic:
“even if the Soviets did supply us, we would need several years to absorb it, especially
into the air force and air defense system.” The two supposedly anti-Soviet officers,
while differing on the scope and timing of the operation, both considered Soviet
support essential.
A double compromise was worked out: according to Shazly, Sadiq agreed to settle
for a thrust reaching only as far as the key mountain passes between the canal zone
and central Sinai, 30–40 miles into Israeli-held territory.
This plan we called Operation 41. In reality, its only virtue was that it would need less
equipment than a wholesale assault across Sinai, so the supplies list presented to the Soviets
would be less traumatic. Therein lay the point. The preparation and development of
Operation 41 was to be done in full collaboration with our Soviet advisers.As the planes and mobile anti-aircraft weapons were insufficient to protect the
advancing forces beyond the cover of the static SAM array east of the canal, Shazly
claims he obtained Sadiq’s consent that, in parallel with Operation 41 but in total
secrecy from the Soviets, another operation was to be planned: the High Minarets.
“This would be based more closely on the actual capability of our armed forces, as
opposed to some notional capability after untold arms shipments. Its objective was
the limited goal I had set of a five- or six-mile penetration.”^29
Soviet feelers toward Israel continued, whether as a parallel option or—more
likely—as a diversion. Meir’s adviser Dinitz had been skeptical about Victor Louis’s
standing in Moscow, and stressed that confidential contacts had to be at an “autho-