FLEXING MUSCLES WHILE OFFERING A PULLBACKGromyko reported repeatedly mentioning “withdrawal”—but only of Israeli forces
from all Eg yptian (and Jordanian) soil as a key Soviet demand.^33
On the same day (24 September), the Politburo approved another meeting with
Israeli officials in Europe, and entrusted it to the KGB. As Primakov was again the
emissary, this removes any remaining doubt as to his subordination to the agency.
According to his memoir, his instructions from the Politburo were to stress that
Soviet influence had moderated the Arab position. Yet he was not to engage in pro-
paganda.^34 Meanwhile, the Foxbat flights continued; but the next day, the IDF
spokesman still denied a Ma’ariv report that Soviet-piloted “MiG-23s” were flying
over Israel proper.^35
In a briefing that Kissinger prepared for Nixon before Gromyko’s visit, not much
of substance was predicted—except for Dobrynin’s “foreshadowing” a shift of
Middle East discussion to the back channel. Kissinger of course supported this, as
“the State Department’s negotiations ... have led Sadat to expect more than we can
deliver from Israel.”^36
The formal talk in the Oval Office (with Rogers present) was essentially a replay of
Gromyko’s discussion with the secretary himself. But afterward, in a “private chat”
that was recorded by Nixon’s taping device, Gromyko sprang his surprise. When the
president stated that “the main thing” at the Moscow summit would be “to have some
things that we can make progress on,” Gromyko cited a discussion he had with
Brezhnev before leaving for the States—that is, his instructions. In respect of the
Middle East, this referred clearly to Kissinger’s “indiscretion”:
Gromyko: ... Some time ago you expressed interest of, I don’t know, Eg ypt, about our
presence there—our military presence.
Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Gromyko: ... In connection with understanding, full understanding on the Middle East, we
are ready to agree not to have our military units there. ... We would leave a limited number
of advisors for purely advisory purposes.So Gromyko offered, almost in Sadat’s very words, what eventually occurred: the
advisers were to remain, while the presence of integral Soviet units was to be ended.
His hesitation (“I don’t know ...”) in specifying Soviet “personnel” and “military
units” was not coincidental: admitting the regulars’ presence contradicted all previ-
ous Soviet statements. But in return he again stipulated the prior acceptance of the
Arabs’ major demands for a comprehensive settlement: “some kind of paperwork ...
which would provide [for] withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of the occupied
territories.”^37
The 1979 installment of Kissinger’s memoirs confirmed that Gromyko “indicated
a new approach to the Middle East; the Soviet Union would be prepared to withdraw
its combat forces from Eg ypt in case of a final settlement (discussed more fully in