JOCKEYING AND POSTURINGtarget and the divizyon fired a missile. It received its signal, but for some reason the target
was missed by 200m—another debacle.The humiliated Okunev blamed the designer, who protested that the missile must
have been defective. “Another Il-28 was about to drop a target. Nikiforov was sure
that Okunev would not permit another launch. ... So Nikiforov ordered a launch on
his own authority, and the Arabs fired a missile at the parachuting target. This time
they didn’t miss.” Altogether, by 10 May Nikiforov replaced bulbs and carried out
successful test launches at six divizyons. After a two-hour briefing for Eg yptian offi-
cers “to remedy their ignorance,” a lavish banquet was held. But another delegation
arrived from Moscow, led by a deputy minister for the aviation industry, Mikhail Il’in,
to check the entire Eg yptian SAM arsenal. It too found “many missiles were disabled
due to dust and debris as a result of Eg yptian negligence.” A new agreement was
signed for a further two months of upgrades, inspection, and training of Eg yptian
technicians, to prepare for the systems’ scheduled handover.^19
C. Kissinger and Sadat in Moscow as the summit looms
On 19 April, Kissinger did not even include the Middle East in a memorandum for
Nixon on “issues for my Moscow trip.”^20 Dobrynin too estimated before Kissinger’s
departure that the latter would “put his main emphasis on Vietnam,” the crucial issue
for Nixon’s reelection. But in return for Soviet “understanding” on that front, the
Americans might “somehow facilitate resolution or progress” on “issues primarily of
interest to the Soviet Union,” including “to some extent, the Middle East.” Kissinger
(Dobrynin estimated) was empowered to continue discussion “in the spirit of the
understanding reached” with Foreign Minister Gromyko, but would probably resort
to generalities such as “principles of conduct” for the superpowers. However,
Kissinger had said that considering the “‘particular sensitivity’ of ... a Middle East
settlement, he intends to discuss this alone [with the Soviet foreign minister], with-
out any aides present,” and asked that he be notified in advance, or taken aside, if the
Soviets intended to bring it up.^21
Describing his secret talks in Moscow on 20–4 April 1972, Kissinger’s memoirs
again belittle the “inconclusive discussion of the Middle East,” blaming Gromyko
who sought to commit me to some general principles. Rather than turn him down flatly, I
replied soothingly with comments long on goodwill, sparse on specifics. ... My objectives
here were modest: [in order] to gain time and ... an incentive for Soviet restraint, I sug-
gested that a detailed discussion be deferred to the summit.^22But the transcript of Kissinger’s conversation with Gromyko shows up the
American’s memory as highly selective, and confirms that the Soviet withdrawal offer
remained under intense discussion.