JOCKEYING AND POSTURINGhis military policies” at a Central Committee plenum where the general secretary
“maneuvered successfully to overcome” any opposition.^29 Based on unattributed
records of the Sadat–Brezhnev–Grechko talks, Kimche holds that their purpose was
“to complete arrangements ... to ‘expel’ about half the Russian personnel,” as
“Brezhnev was particularly interested that nothing should interfere with the policy
of Détente which he intended to finalize at a summit meeting.”^30 At the time, analysts
noted the first explicit, if “guarded,” Soviet acknowledgment—in the joint commu-
niqué—of the Arabs’ right to use “other” than peaceful means to liberate the lands
held by Israel.^31 This was supposedly balanced by a new Soviet demand that arms
shipments be paid for in hard currency, but a solution for the financial problem was
already in the works as part of the “expulsion” exercise.
This corresponds with Heikal’s version that Sadat and Brezhnev had “much nego-
tiation” over an Eg yptian demand (and supposed Soviet reluctance) to turn over the
SAM-3 batteries to Eg yptian crews that had already returned from training in the
USSR—exactly what the Soviets, as already seen, were more than ready to do and had
in fact begun.
A few days after Sadat’s return, Defense Minister Sadiq issued a directive imposing
strict and intricate procedures on visits by the Soviet “experts and advisers” to field
units. Such visits now had to be requested by the “senior Soviet adviser,” and transport
had to be arranged, nine days in advance. The guests had to be escorted throughout,
and a report about their visit submitted after its conclusion. These provisions could
hardly apply to the field units’ resident advisers. The order’s language clarifies that it
represented a tightening of supervision over the top, Cairo-based Soviet officers’
activities—or a deliberate move to create such an impression.^32
This and other alleged disagreements were “papered over” during a “friendly visit” by
Grechko, Navy Commander Gorshkov, Kutakhov and a bevy of Soviet officers to Eg ypt
in mid-May 1972—that is, between Sadat’s talks in Moscow and the summit. Heikal
lists among the disagreements a demand by Gorshkov for naval “facilities” at Mersa
Matruh, which the Eg yptian military (and Heikal himself ) opposed.^33 But Soviet
sources state that “our ships were stationed” there already. Indeed, as in Alexandria,
Soviet control of Mersa Matruh was such that “someone got it into his head to post
[Soviet] sentries even in the desert, at the approaches to town. These sentries once
barred Sadat and Qaddafi from entering ... which touched off a huge scandal.”^34
At any rate, the papering-over was quite ostentatious, particularly in the naval
sphere: the Soviet minister and navy chief officiated at a ceremony in Sadat’s resi-
dence, where the president decorated “for military achievements” twelve Soviet naval
officers, including the captain and first mate of nuclear submarine K-313. The sub-
marine was on port call in Alexandria, for what was now publicized as the first such
visit—more than three years after such calls actually began. The veterans’ accounts
have added that the accolade was for a successful demonstration by K-313 and the
cruiser Grozny of two naval missiles at ranges of 90–100 kilometers.^35 The Soviets did