THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973not spoil the show by informing the Eg yptians that a leak had sprung—apparently
from the cooling system of the submarine’s reactor—and it was ordered to continue
its Mediterranean patrol for another month, during which the crew was exposed to
an amount of radiation “that remained secret for the rest of their lives.”^36
Cairo Radio also announced that Grechko and Kutakhov attended a demonstra-
tion for Sadat and Sadiq of “aircraft flying at 24,000m and 3,000kmh,” which were
still identified in Western and Israeli analyses as “MiG-23s.”^37 The communiqué
described them as flown by Eg yptian pilots, and the same was claimed of two such
craft that made another sortie over southern Sinai on the same day, 16 May. This was
allegedly in order to impress Grechko that the EAF could take charge of the advanced
planes. All recent Russian testimonies contradict this claim.^38 In March, the test-pilot
component of Bezhevets’s original team had been replaced by regular Soviet Air
Force pilots, indicating that the Eg yptian deployment had completed the MiG-25’s
experimental phase. The R version was formally certified as operational in
December.^39 But the Soviets never agreed to let Eg yptians near the planes even in
1973; in mid-’72, this remained one of several genuinely contentious points, while
the overall agreed withdrawal was being secretly coordinated. Otherwise, the
Grechko visit looked then, and still does, like a show of continuing Soviet commit-
ment on the very eve of the Moscow summit.
It was undoubtedly all the more convincing because the IAF’s anti-Foxbat tactic
that Hod had outlined to Momyer the previous October, and Phantom pilots had
rehearsed for months, was now tried—and failed. After thirty-five years, one of the
pilots, Uri Ya’ari, apologetically blamed a series of technical breakdowns and human
errors for what he considers the Israelis’ missed opportunity to score the first MiG-25
shootdown.^40 A slightly differing account was given by his squadron commander and
formation leader, Spector, but they agree that both the F-4s and their pilots were
stretched to the limit of their physical capability, in vain.^41