THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973flying and operating sophisticated weapons themselves.”^9 This was almost the exact
opposite of the situation on the ground. The back-channel agreement was thus effec-
tively camouflaged even within the US administration.
Uninformed about Kissinger’s moves, the CIA too continued for some time to
refer to an unilateral, comprehensive “ouster” of the Soviets from Eg ypt resulting
from Soviet reluctance to supply offensive weapons, even while the agency registered
specific exceptions and reservations to both elements. Ultimately, this would feed
into the CIA’s failure to foresee an Eg yptian offensive. CIA Director William Colby
(1973–6) admitted as much after the Yom Kippur War: “over a period of time many
of our Middle East analysts apparently developed a conceptual framework that sim-
ply did not allow them to accept what in retrospect turned out to be fairly good
evidence of impending hostilities.”
While offering praise for Kissinger’s performance, Colby slipped in a jab at his
secretiveness—and, subtly, at its results. “It is clear that the back channel in many
instances is becoming the main channel, causing lost and even counterproductive
motion, aside from anguish, among many not in the circuit.” Colby suggested that at
least he should be informed and consulted.^10
The widespread misperception of the “expulsion” is all the more notable because,
despite Kissinger’s best efforts, even at the time there were indications of the with-
drawal’s actual character and scope. Al-Ahram stated explicitly that “instructors
needed to support Eg yptian military forces” would stay on, which a leading Israeli
commentator calculated to mean at least a third of the total Soviet manpower in
Eg ypt.^11 Such distinctions were largely lost in the sweep of generalizations that all the
Soviets were being ejected. At best, the prevailing, erroneous notion was that the
expulsion pertained chiefly and definitely to advisers, with the withdrawal of integral
units only a possible complement. The question of how the estimated count of evacu-
ees could consist only or mainly of advisers, whose number was a fraction of the total
figure, was hardly addressed.
Over time, the conventional description became that the Soviets “complied,
indeed over-complied immediately” with Sadat’s order within one week of 17 July,
“withdrawing personnel beyond the advisers sent with the air-defense system in 1970,
so that even Soviet instructors working in Eg yptian military institutions were with-
drawn. They took with them all their SAM equipment and refused to sell any of the
systems to Eg ypt.”^12 This distortion was facilitated by the previous references to the
regular Soviet formations as “experts,” “technicians,” or “advisers.” TASS was quite
truthful when it “announced that Soviet forces in Eg ypt had ‘completed their func-
tions’ and would ‘shortly return’ to the USSR ... These forces were intended to remain
in Eg ypt for only a ‘limited period’ and ... both sides had ‘deemed it expedient’ to
bring them home.” But as intended, the CIA read this as making the best of a setback:
“the Soviets have chosen conciliatory language in order to minimize the damage.”^13