“WE CAN’T CONTROL THE ARABS BUT MUST SUPPORT THEM”himself.^22 Retrospectively, Eg yptian sources attached great importance to this delega-
tion as a milestone in preparations for war: it was led by none other than Lashchenko,
the original architect of the cross-canal offensive plan. No Western reports men-
tioned his presence, but Lashchenko “left with an agreed list of our armament needs”
for the operation—“The Final Deal.”
On documents later captured by Israel, the earliest date of an operational plan is
14 January 1973—a date also claimed by Sadat in several retrospective interviews.^23
According to Heikal, Lashchenko arrived the day after a top-secret meeting (on
31 January) of the Eg yptian and Syrian military chiefs, who set up a unified com-
mand and determined that only their armies (not other potential partners, such as
Libya) would take part in the offensive.^24 The Soviet general was thus presented with
a specific blueprint, and endorsed it along with the associated requests for materiel,
which Moscow would formally approve the next month.
Reports reaching Israel soon verified the delivery of at least two essential items on
this list: water cannon and large quantities of Malyutkas. For now, their significance was
dismissed; one Israeli general was quoted by a colleague as boasting : “put all the
Eg yptian paratroops on a hill with Saggers, and I’ll wipe them out with a couple of
tanks.”^25 MI chief Ze’ira admitted after the war that “in hindsight he realized that Sadat
changed his concept sometime in spring or summer 1973.” The Agranat Commission
found that the evidence at the time already indicated this change occurred at the begin-
ning of the year, when the Eg yptians resolved to fight Israel “with whatever military
resources they had, even without fulfillment of the condition of acquiring long-range
fighter-bombers.”^26 In fact, however, even this condition was already being fulfilled.
Within two weeks, “Israeli and Eg yptian planes fought a brief air battle over the Gulf
of Suez ... breaking eight months of silence” since the “expulsion.”^27
These developments were eclipsed by a supposed diplomatic breakthrough when
Hafez Ismail consented to visit Washington (after standing for some time on meet-
ings in Europe). Much has been made, most recently in a book by Yigal Kipnis, of a
peace initiative that Ismail floated on behalf of Sadat. Disagreement centers on
whether it was sidetracked by Kissinger himself or disregarded by Meir and her cabi-
net, thereby missing an opportunity to avert war and leading Sadat to settle on war
preparations only in July 1973.^28
The IDF’s voluminous official history of the Yom Kippur War suggests the oppo-
site: that “in the fall of 1972, or at the latest in the spring of 1973”—that is, by the
time of Lashchenko’s visit and Ismail’s mission—Sadat had already abandoned “hopes
that the powers would impose [an Israeli] withdrawal ... without a military move.”^29
This might be construed as retrospective apologetics, but the following survey of
Soviet and Eg yptian activity hardly indicates that in 1973, any more than at any time
since the summer of 1967, they were genuinely open to any option but a military one.
What might have followed a complete Israeli acceptance of Sadat’s terms—including
the Palestinian non-starter—or a full, unilateral Israeli withdrawal is a matter of