THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973the date of the military action about five or six days in advance.”^16 In 2000, this ver-
sion was adopted in an official Russian history, which stated that on 4 October,
Moscow was not notified by the Eg yptians at all, but rather learned about the
impending war from its own intelligence.^17 At any rate, Soviet actions make it unnec-
essary to sort out what looks like rather pathetic retrospective inter-service bickering
in Yeltsin-era Moscow. What matters is that on 4 October, Soviet action shifted from
a military buildup that could at least partly be concealed to high-profile moves that
had to be detected—indeed, were intended to be.
By 7 p.m. on 4 October, when Gromyko convened senior Foreign Ministry offi-
cials to tell them that “the Eg yptian and Syrian leaders had made their final decision
to attack Israel,” he could state that “the matter had already been discussed at the
‘highest level’ in the Kremlin,” and “steps were being taken to evacuate Soviet civilian
personnel and their families.” It makes little difference whether this move was initi-
ated by Moscow or, as Akopov stated, it was prompted by Sadat: “it is my duty to
warn you because you have too many people and specialists here.” The former variant
seems more plausible, as upon receiving the order from Kosygin, Vinogradov (as
Israelyan claims the ambassador told him) tried to object, out of anxiety that such an
overt measure would give away the Arab plan. But he was denied his usual direct
access to Brezhnev—on the grounds that “such apprehensions had been thoroughly
considered by the Politburo.” The target date for evacuation was thus set in advance,
and disclosed to both Eg yptians and Soviets at various levels on a need-to-know
basis—which explains the conflicting versions given to researchers by former Soviet
officials as to whether the evacuation was intended as a warning to the United States
or was undertaken despite this predictable effect.^18
Gromyko evaded a question about the elimination of the surprise factor when one
of his aides dared to pose it, and would not instruct them how to explain the evacu-
ation if asked. He laid down the official Soviet line by repeating several times that the
war would start on Saturday, 6 October, at 2:00 p.m. and that “neither [he] nor
Brezhnev supported the Arab decision. ... The Soviet leadership had done everything
it could to talk Sadat and Assad” out of it.^19 The military history also attributes to
Gromyko an angry response: “they didn’t listen to us! They’re rushing ahead without
knowing themselves what for!”^20 His performance is about as credible as Kissinger’s
surprise at the “expulsion.”
This line, rather than the overwhelming evidence against it even at the time, estab-
lished itself in Western historiography in such formulations as “the Soviet Union
repeatedly warned Sadat against the use of military force.”^21 It is just barely possible
that there was time to convene the Politburo following an out-of-the-blue message
from Cairo, to conduct “thorough consideration” and take extensive practical mea-
sures within a few hours. But the evacuation clearly could not have been implemented
on 4 October if it had been ordered only on the same day.