THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREATat all of the Scuds’ arrival in Eg ypt (though this had been communicated to them by
the Israelis in August) and did not envisage any nuclear use for them:
Adm. Moorer: ...The Israelis think the Soviets have given them some SCUDs, and we have
seen some on the docks at Nicolai [sic], but we have no proof that there are any in Eg ypt.
... It’s a terror vehicle. ... It would have no really serious effect but it would scare hell out of
the Israelis. It’s an expensive way to deliver a 1000-pound bomb.^18Five days later, on the 22nd, as the first ceasefire was about to go into effect, conven-
tionally tipped Scuds were fired at the Israelis’ canal counter-crossing point. Moorer was
right as to the effect on the Israelis: in 1993, Bar-Lev—as Israel’s ambassador to post-
Soviet Russia—still claimed to Israelyan that the Scuds were very inaccurate and did not
damage Israeli targets, but admitted that “it was a big excitement.”^19
It was such an excitement that the Israelis suppressed the news at the time and
never officially confirmed the missile hits nor the Soviet connection. An IAF publica-
tion disclosed in 2006 that “one of about three missiles” struck a convoy of ammuni-
tion trucks, killing seven soldiers.^20 This article cited a study by the IDF History
Department, but five years later the department’s own detailed compilation of com-
mand deliberations during the war does not mention that Scud impacts were identi-
fied or reported among “Eg yptian violations of the ceasefire that caused Israeli casual-
ties.”^21 The IDF memorial site still lists none of the fatalities on that day as a victim of
a Scud strike; one is described as “a driver in an ammo convoy” in the same sector.^22
Any suggestion that Eg yptian operators alone were involved is negated by the
testimony of the interpreter Agafonov, who came with the advisers that accompanied
the missiles’ arrival in July. He related that at the outbreak of war, “the Eg yptian Scud
brigade was urgently supported by a group of specialists and regulars-instructors, and
brought up to battle readiness.” Israelyan adds that the missiles were also “guarded by
a Soviet military unit,” like the spetsnaz detachment that guarded the MiG-25s in
1971–2 and during their wartime redeployment. Although the training course that
Agafonov’s team had been assigned to give the Eg yptians was not yet completed, he
states that the latter “pressed the button,” after Sadat obtained Moscow’s consent.
According to Israelyan, the required authorization was given by Defense Minister
Grechko. He describes the marshal’s order as an offhand response to Vinogradov’s
repeated badgering from Cairo, in contravention of official Kremlin policy (which
aroused the ire of Gromyko, who tried belatedly to prevent it).^23 This account seemed
suspicious to begin with: Grechko could hardly have undertaken such an escalation of
the direct Soviet role without at least some backing at Politburo level—presumably,
including Brezhnev.
Chernyaev’s diary has now confirmed that Grechko not only had such approval,
but that he was instructed to initiate the Scud launches. On 1 December, Chernyaev
wrote that he had “found out from the documents” that Brezhnev, contrary to the