THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973rubles. Most of an “internationalist’s” pay was credited to his account and paid upon
his repatriation in “yellow checks”—certificates that could be redeemed at Beriozka
foreign-currency stores. “Dazed by the windfall,” Kon’kov “wanted to fill a taxi with
cognac and speed home to Yaroslavl’,” but his sober grandmother made sure he went
by train.^43
Pilots and other officers did even better. Out of their pay in Eg ypt, advisers “could
save enough for a Soviet-made car in 7–8 months”—even a Moskvich 412, “the
dernier cri of Soviet fashion.”^44 A colonel was paid 100 Eg yptian pounds, at an official
exchange rate of 6 rubles; but felt that for “combat officers who risked their lives daily,
this was low. We knew that specialists bringing in weapons from other countries got
three times as much.”^45 As a naval-aviation engineer recalls, “Our pilots’ patriotism
also had a material basis.” In addition to standard salaries of 300 to 500 rubles, they
received a special allowance of up to 1,000 rubles “which was terrific money. When
they returned to the Soviet Union they bought cars and smashed them up for lack of
[driving ] experience.”^46
Even had US propaganda successfully presented aid for Eg ypt as depriving Soviet
consumers, this was a basic misreading of Kremlin priorities. The economic cost of
Moscow’s vastly expanded presence in Eg ypt was acutely realized; as Shelest noted:
“this is not going to come cheaply for our people and state.”^47 But even at the height
of détente five years later, with the USSR in its worst recorded drought and desperate
for US grain supplies, a Soviet official would note derisively:
perhaps Kissinger and Nixon really adhere to the concept so widely promoted by the New
York Times and the Washington Post, who believe that the best way to establish universal
peace on earth, or at least prevent nuclear war, is to raise the Soviet people’s standard of
living to American levels.^48The US “control group” went on to a forecasting error: “The Soviets, disappointed
with Nasser’s performance, may wish to make Algeria their major tool for their
troublemaking in the area.”^49 In fact, the involvement of Algerian President Houari
Boumedienne was already being seen in Moscow as a hindrance to the main Russian
effort in Eg ypt.^50 Within a year, Algeria would rebuff Soviet requests for the use of
its main naval base at Mers-el-Kébir; in 1970, even the personal intercession of Soviet
Navy Commander Sergey Gorshkov failed to obtain this concession, as well as joint
naval maneuvers and use of a military airfield—all of which (as US intelligence con-
firmed) the Soviets had by then achieved in Eg ypt.^51
Overall, the control group memo recommended that the United States “be careful
about our Soviet relations and not force the Soviets into a corner. We must not fall
into the Soviet trap which seeks to tie us with Israel. We must not gloat over Soviet
discomforture [sic].” In order to “prevent a new military buildup in the area,” this
inter-service group suggested “not [to] focus for the time being on the Soviet military
resupply. This is not yet of alarming proportions and to focus on it would be wrong