THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973point that would make such a war inevitable, but also by rebuilding a background of mili-
tary numbers that would make it possible.^71His prognosis was based, among other things, on a report from Moscow by the
veteran Indian correspondent Dev Murarka:
The Russians are determined that in the next round Israel must not be the winner. For one
thing the Russians are likely to persuade the Arabs to be better prepared and to undertake
more intensive training of their troops. ... Soviet energ y in the coming months will be
directed toward coming closer to the Arabs, rather than in the quest of an elusive Middle
East settlement.^72Galili was right in ascribing more weight to Murarka’s report than mere specula-
tion. In 1985, the Indian newsman was listed by a former KGB operative who special-
ized in recruiting “cooperation from professional foreign journalists stationed in
Moscow” via the Novosti news agency. “Murarka was in fact ‘our man.’ ...
Mr Murarka’s ‘freelance’ status was a fake.”^73 The well-placed leak eagerly published
as an “exclusive” would be widely employed by all the parties to the conflict.
D. Brezhnev ascendant: domestic repercussions in the USSR
Later accounts described the Central Committee plenum of 20 June 1967 as the
climactic clash in a protracted struggle between Brezhnev’s allies and his rivals, but
the general secretary’s authority was in fact challenged openly just by Nikolay
Egorychev. The party boss in the city of Moscow had visited Eg ypt shortly before the
war and had actually recommended all-out support for Nasser, so that Egorychev may
have expressed genuine concern for his bailiwick’s security, or acted for unrelated
motives, when he now questioned Brezhnev’s Middle Eastern policy.^74 He “infringed
on the General Secretary’s personal jurisdiction by asking whether the defeat of the
USSR’s Arab allies did not cast doubt on its own capability to defend its own terri-
t o r y.”^75 Shelest confided to his diary that Egorychev “spoke the absolute truth, also
addressing Brezhnev as Head of the Defense Council. What ‘politician’ likes such
criticism?” But Shelest himself and others did not join in, the purportedly moderate
Kosygin was absent, and such opposition as Egorychev’s speech represented was
swiftly quashed.^76 By the end of the session, he was deposed; the recently appointed
KGB chief Yury Andropov, who had supported the intervention plan, not only
retained his post but was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo.
The Central Committee classified the Middle Eastern crisis as “a confrontation
between progressive Arab regimes and the vanguard of world imperialism, Israel” and
ruled out any accommodation in this “clash of ideologies.”^77 The region was singled
out specifically by the Soviet military as a theater for the “liberating mission of the
Armed Forces” according to the nascent “Grechko Doctrine”, named for Defense