The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

UAR was long since not a nonaligned country, that for over a decade it was in step with

the Soviet Union.^6

Relating this in Moscow to his Polish visitor even before Podgorny returned,
Brezhnev quoted the Eg yptian president more bluntly: “Nasser ... would like to for-
sake the policy of disengagement and reach a direct military agreement with the
socialist countries.” Like Podgorny’s delegation in Cairo, the top leadership in
Moscow was unprepared for this ostensible triumph. As Brezhnev put it,

One cannot naturally announce it, but one must attend to it ... The Politburo ... has dis-

cussed a number of times ... what position we should take towards Nasser’s proposal. ... we

responded: we welcome with satisfaction his position ... but we do not consider it proper

for the UAR to deviate from the policy of nonengagement. ... Nasser recognized the cor-

rectness of our position.^7

A CIA report in 1971 quoted with some reservation a source (whose identity was
still withheld when the document was declassified in 2007) as being told by
“Eg yptian leaders”:

Soon after the 1967 war the Eg yptians had asked the Soviets to take over responsibility for

the war-shattered Eg yptian air defense; an elaborate agreement was supposedly worked out

... but the Soviets then “got cold feet” and backed away ... It seems unlikely that the USSR

would have even considered such a suggestion in the immediate aftermath of the dangers

run during the June 1967 war, but this story may nevertheless have some validity as a gar-

bled reflection of Eg yptian–Soviet arguments on the subject in 1968 and 1969.^8

However, the evidence now available does indicate that in June–July 1967 the
Soviets, while balking at a declared political alliance with Eg ypt, not only contem-
plated Nasser’s specific military request but complied. “Nasser’s attention was called
to the necessity to address the solution of this issue not only from the viewpoint of
military efficacy but also with weighty consideration of the political aspect, while
taking into account the international resonance and domestic reactions.”^9
The Soviets had their own tactical concerns to address: their airlift’s main terminal
at Cairo-West had been exposed. This heightened the perceived urgency of defending
this and other points of Soviet presence. According to a member of Pogdorny’s entou-
rage, future KGB rezident (station chief ) in Eg ypt Vadim Kirpichenko, Nasser was
promised “much more active assistance in organizing Eg ypt’s air defense.”^10
The internal Soviet report about Podgorny’s talks in Cairo (released thirty-five
years later) stopped just short of specifying that Eg ypt had requested, or Moscow
had approved, the manning of newly supplied SAM batteries by integral Soviet
crews, as distinct from individual advisers: “Consent was given to supply military
equipment, armaments, and military advisers. In respect of organizing the air
defense service, the degree and form of the Soviet side’s participation” was theoreti-