HOLDING THE LINE ON THE SUEZ CANALcally subordinated to the aforementioned political considerations.^11 But in practice,
deployment of Soviet air defense detachments had already begun before Podgorny’s
talks ended.
B. Creating precedents: Soviet air defense units dispatched to Eg ypt
In a July 1967 session of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Politburo, Shelest
encountered blunt criticism: “we took up the question of air defense in Ukraine,” and
General A[leksandr] Pokryshkin reported on its “grim” state. “It is simply criminal
that ... in our republic, many vital objects are vulnerable, unprotected and unde-
fended, while at the same time equipment and crews, ... combat aircraft and SAM
batteries are being dispatched to ‘cover’ Cairo.” Shelest noted that after hearing
Pokryshkin’s “very disturbing and important question, I took [it] up with
L. Brezhnev.” The general secretary heard him out “in Olympic serenity” and replied:
“don’t interfere in this issue. There is an overall plan and we are following it.”^12
At the Budapest conference on 11 July, Polish Party Chief Władysław Gomułka
reported that “Nasser also approached us about delivery of anti-aircraft machine guns
and radar equipment, but at the same time he demanded sending people to service
this equipment, as it turns out that he doesn’t have such people.”^13 Brezhnev con-
firmed that by then 182 anti-aircraft cannon and 300 AA machine guns had been
dispatched by air, along with 334 “military advisers.” As the latter are listed separately
from “officers-advisers,” this figure clearly referred to the weapons’ operators. As
Brezhnev explained,
with regard to the participation of Soviet forces in their anti-aircraft defense, etc.—for
which they asked us—we thought ... it is more advisable to send an unlimited number of
Soviet advisers, even to form here and there complete advisory units, but not to take the entire
air defense into our hands.^14Vladimir Shirin, a SAM divizyon commander “on active duty defending our
[Soviet] airspace,” was ordered in late July 1967 to prepare for a mission to a “hot, arid
climate.”^15 He was kept on hold for some time; “later we learned that the question was
being discussed whether to send military ‘experts’ or ‘advisers’ to Eg ypt, and the
government decided on ‘advisers.’” Shirin and three colleagues from his outfit were
rushed through five days of briefing, and their yet-undefined status was reflected by
a last-minute change: “first we were told that we were going for a year’s mission with-
out our families. Two days before departure, this was changed to two years and docu-
ments could be arranged for the families.”^16
The Soviets’ presence was indirectly detected by Western journalists who left Cairo
as soon as civilian flights were resumed: they noticed that “anti-aircraft guns bristle
from dunes around the airport.”^17 By 21 June, “gun placements appeared in Cairo and
new antiaircraft gun trenches were being built on the outskirts.”^18 It was the Yugoslav