HOLDING THE LINE ON THE SUEZ CANALDid Molodtsov, carried away by his fleeting moment in the limelight, really exceed
his instructions? That would be highly atypical of such a veteran Soviet officer, who
had already commanded a ship in the celebrated landing behind Nazi lines at
Novorossiisk during the Second World War. He had been promoted from captain
first class to rear admiral just before the crisis of May–June 1967, and was put in
provisional command of the “combined eskadra” until Sysoev took over on 11 May.
But soon after his star turn in Alexandria, he was transferred to a teaching position at
a naval academy. This might have been considered a kick upstairs had Petrov not just
vacated the same position. Reluctance to stress the Soviet role in the signal victory at
Ras el-Ish might be as plausibly attributed to the Eg yptians—who also had the final
say in censoring their own press—as to the Russians.
The day after Molodtsov’s threat, his ships took no immediate action when Israeli
naval craft sank two Eg yptian torpedo boats 75 kilometers northeast of Port Said.^68
But the Soviet Navy’s mission to deter Israeli land and air “aggression” into Eg ypt was
accomplished. When on 15 July air battles resumed along the canal, “Cairo sources
said Israeli planes stayed well clear of Port Said ... where eight Soviet ships have been
moored since Monday at Eg ypt’s invitation.”^69 As General Hod told his USAF col-
leagues in January 1968, “Russian ships are tied in with the Eg yptian air defense
s y s t e m .”^70 The Soviets later took credit for deterring Israel from any air raid on
Alexandria, even when Cairo itself was buzzed and bombed in 1969–70.^71
In New York, it was noted that “while the United Nations Security Council sought
a formula to station UN truce observers in the troubled Suez Canal zone, Soviet sea
power was already there.”^72 Only after the flotilla had anchored on 9 July did Soviet
Ambassador Nikolay Fedorenko retract a threat to veto the observers’ dispatch; the
resolution was passed the next day, and the observers took up their positions only on
the 17th.^73 Novosti’s Egorin visited Ismailia as soon as the Eg yptian authorities per-
mitted, “at the end of July,” and already met, in the sandbagged front-line trenches, a
Soviet adviser to the local battalion commander with an interpreter. Their arrange-
ments to write home had not yet been set up, indicating that they had been posted
recently and hurriedly. But as the adviser told Egorin that Israeli fire had increased
“when it became known that UN observers were to be sent in,” the adviser evidently
was there earlier—during, if not before, the Ras el-Ish engagement.^74
The Soviets’ coup was instantly and correctly recognized by leading analysts, such
as the veteran UN correspondent William Frye:
the Kremlin was conveying a clear message to Israel ... Thus far, and no farther ... Bluff or
not, the positioning of Soviet striking power within easy range of Israeli front lines read-
justed the balance of power in the area. It inhibited the use of Israeli air power against
Eg yptian artillery in the Port Said–Port Fuad region.Frye’s conclusion, though, was still by way of understatement: though he says “the
move was as close as the Soviet Union has come to an open threat of physical interven-