The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973. The USSR’s Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973

tion,”^75 inserting regular Soviet forces, even in a tripwire function, was already more
than a mere threat. As recognized by 1971 in James Cable’s classic study Gunboat
Diplomacy, this was “a clear-cut case of the purposeful use of limited naval force” which
achieved its objective. “Whether or not the Israelis had ever intended a further advance
none was made, and some of the credit earlier lost by the Soviet Union in Arab eyes was
regained. Indeed, this seemingly trivial intervention probably had more immediate
impact than the intrinsically more important deliveries of arms.”^76
Meanwhile, the commotion around the Soviet ships in Eg ypt provided a perfect
diversion from the Fifth Eskadra’s formal inauguration on 14 July. Gorshkov himself
joined Kasatonov to preside over the ceremony at Antikythera.^77 Future Admiral of
the Fleet Ivan Kapitanets, who ferried Kasatonov back to Sevastopol on board his
destroyer Nastoychivy, noted that the admiral stressed among the Eskadra’s missions
“cooperation with the Eg yptian and Syrian navies and the [Soviet] advisers’ appa-
rat.”^78 If the Sixth Fleet picked up any signals or other indications of this portentous
event, it was kept under wraps and went unmentioned in the Western media, which
routinely reported every passage of Soviet warships through the Turkish straits.
Likewise, although Molodtsov charged that aircraft of the US Sixth Fleet had shad-
owed his ships as they moved toward Eg ypt (a complaint more often voiced by the
Americans), Washington apparently did not relay any warning to Israel.
This may explain Dayan’s departure from his previous caution: the day before the
Eskadra’s ships arrived in Eg ypt, he stated to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that

he would not hesitate to advise his government to fight Russia if Soviet troops were ever

used against Israel ... it was possible Soviet troops might fight with the Arabs in a future

war because the recent crisis had shown them that Arab soldiers were of little use. ... Russia

is using Arab dependence on it for arms to obtain complete influence in the Middle East.

This was mainly a symptom of internecine political sniping : Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol, smarting from Dayan’s glorification for the June victory, was openly favoring
Rabin.^79
But Dayan’s bravado aroused genuine concern among his colleagues, who forced
him to issue a clarification:

The commotion ... reverberated in the cabinet session. Several ministers severely criticized

[his] frequent statements ... which even if misinterpreted might have caused grave damage

... Mr Dayan clarified that the reporter, while discussing the continued supply of Soviet

arms to Eg ypt, asked what Israel would do if Soviet crews took part in the fighting? In such

a case, the Defense Minister noted, he would recommend to the government to fight those

crews, too.^80

Dayan’s semi-retraction was published on the day that Molodtsov sounded his
threat, which appeared to vindicate the Israeli minister’s earlier apprehension about
provoking the Soviets. The Israel mission in New York had already warned of