HOLDING THE LINE ON THE SUEZ CANALAmerican resentment at “Dayan’s remarks about a war with the USSR” and reported
US demands “for us to act out of national unity, self-confidence, in a low key while
maintaining proportions.”^81 Now Jerusalem urgently directed its embassy in
Washington to “ask US Government for their opinion on the declaration of the
Soviet flotilla commander in Alexandria.”^82
But at least in public, there was little US verbal reaction, and even less in the the-
ater of operations. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey declined to
comment on the Russian Navy’s new presence in Eg ypt or on Molodtsov’s statement.
Instead, he continued to stress “increasing concern [about] reports of continued
shipments of aircraft and other arms to the UAR ...,” hinting darkly that “we do [have
details on the volume of deliveries] but I am afraid that is classified ... It is significant
enough to warrant the comment that I just made.”^83 The same recurred on 20 July
when British sources reported “Soviet marines sighted in Port Said and Ismailia,”
from among the “thousands of marines” on nine Soviet warships and landing craft in
Port Said. Both “British and US officials ... said that positioning Soviet naval com-
mando units outside the USSR is an innovation for Russia and if true, this fact might
be a very significant event on the way to dangerous confrontation in areas of tension
worldwide.” But on record, McCloskey said that the State Department “cannot even
check whether there indeed were marines on board” the Soviet ships.^84
The next day, these ships, which were “originally scheduled to remain a week ...
extended their stay indefinitely at Eg ypt’s invitation as renewed Arab–Israeli fighting
sullied the Suez truce line.”^85 Port Said and Alexandria thus became Soviet naval bases
in all but name. This formality allowed NATO experts even a year later to insist that
“the Soviets as yet have no naval base in the Mediterranean and ... the Eg yptians will
not be prepared for such a possibility.”^86 But US naval circles were soon concerned
that “a preemptive landing by even a small force of Soviet naval infantrymen from one
of the two LSMs [landing ships, medium] they normally keep in the Mediterranean
could seriously restrict the use of superior US naval power because of the risk of direct
confrontation”—a preliminary step toward Soviet aspirations “to control ... the
Mediterranean.”^87
The continuous presence of warships and marines, with increasing control of shore
facilities, would last through 1972. Alexandria, farther from the war zone and
shielded from Israeli air attack by the Soviet presence, assumed the main function of
the Eskadra’s maintenance, repair and supply. Its commerce and nightlife, whose
continuing vibrancy despite the war astonished the Soviets, also provided their rec-
reation.^88 Port Said, on the other hand, was a combat station, and the Soviets’ role
there remained holding the line against the Israelis’ perceived intention to complete
their occupation of the canal’s east bank. “We sat there and looked at each other,”
Capt. Yury Khripunkov recalled a quarter century later.
There were the Israeli forces on one side, and on the other—astern of us—were ours, that
is the Arabs’, and I was in the middle. Every morning at 0345 I would go out on the bridge,